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Abstract 
Behavioral priming traces its roots back to 1890, but recently has been criticized for 
failure to replicate.  In response, researchers argued the need for more meta-analyses (Bargh, 
2012).  Accordingly, the following meta-analysis sought to estimate its mean effect size and to 
quantify publication bias as well as the effects of moderators like goal expectancy (ease), filler 
tasks, goal value, and the directness of the association between prime and outcome.  We 
estimated a mean of d = 0.4220 across 682 eligible effect sizes.  Despite evidence of some 
publication bias, the trim and fill procedure recalculated the mean effect to be d = 0.2661, 
indicating that behavioral priming is likely a true effect, if perhaps overestimated in the 
literature.  Our findings regarding goal expectancy, filler tasks, and goal value are somewhat 
mixed, but we consistently found that indirect primes, which require more interpretation to 
produce the outcome, had larger effect sizes than more direct primes.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
William James, one of psychology’s earliest founding fathers, coined the term 
“ideomotor action” in 1890 to describe the phenomenon wherein merely observing or thinking 
about a behavior makes one more likely to engage in that behavior.  This was one of the earliest 
conceptions of behaviors as mental constructs, subject to activation and accessibility similar to 
attitudes or cognitions.  Despite this early recognition, researchers ignored the implications of 
behavior as a representation until fairly recently.  When Lashley first used the term priming in 
1951, and for several decades after, it was assumed that the effects of this surreptitious activation 
of concepts could only affect the activation of other internal-only representations – attitudes, 
cognitions, feelings, but not behavior.  It wasn’t until 1996 that Bargh, Chen, and Burrows, 
building on James’ notion of behaviors as representations, hypothesized that behaviors too could 
be automatically activated through priming.  The success of their experiments changed the field 
of priming – and arguably of social psychology as a whole – forever.   
The Perception-Behavior Link 
In 1996, Bargh and colleagues dared to hypothesize that behaviors themselves, not just 
the attitudes or cognitions that might lead one to consciously choose a behavior, could be 
induced via primes presented without conscious awareness of their content.  They called it the 
perception-behavior link: that people will match their behavior to a prime without any required 
intent or conscious awareness; that is, merely perceiving a concept is enough to elicit 
corresponding behavior.   
Bargh and colleagues tested their theory with three studies.  In the first, participants were 
instructed to unscramble sets of 5 words to form 4-word sentences, then come find the 
experimenter to begin a second task.  Embedded in these sets were words related to rudeness or 
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politeness (or neither, in the control condition), and the dependent variable of interest was how 
long participants waited to interrupt the experimenter, who was engaged in conversation with a 
confederate, to get on with the second task.  Consistent with the team’s hypotheses, the rudeness-
primed participants interrupted much sooner than the other groups, and the politeness-primed 
participants interrupted much later, supporting the hypothesis and the underlying perception-
behavior theory.  The second study also included a scrambled sentence task, but this time the 
concept being primed was elderly (or neutral words in the control condition).  After completing 
this task, participants thought the study was over and left the experimental room.  A confederate 
surreptitiously watched the participants exit and timed their walk from the door to a mark on the 
floor, a distance of 9.75 meters.  The team had hypothesized that participants primed with the 
concept elderly would walk more slowly than the control participants, in line with elderly 
people’s stereotypically slow movement.  Once again, the hypothesis was supported, further 
bolstering the perception-behavior link.  Finally, the third study subliminally exposed 
participants to white or black male faces, then staged a computer malfunction that would force 
participants to start the task over.  Expecting that participants exposed to the black male faces 
would enact the hostility stereotypically attributed to this group, researchers measured 
participants’ reactions to the inconvenience.  As expected, the black-primed group expressed 
greater levels of hostility than the white-primed group.  Taken together, these studies showed 
support for the perception-behavior link, and the field of social behavior priming was born. 
The Goal Activation Account   
While the perception-behavior link presents behavior as a mirror-like response to the 
primed category or trait, other theories present behavior as the result of goals activated by the 
stimulus.  Researchers connected automatic behavior to goals in the auto-motive model, but in 
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this model, deliberate, conscious behavior had to precede automatic behavior (Bargh, 1990; 
Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994).  Behaviors could be unconsciously enacted in service of a goal upon 
the mere perception of a stimulus, but only if those behaviors had been previously consciously 
enacted in service of that goal in the presence of the same stimulus a sufficient number of times 
to create an association.  This model did not propose full automaticity of behavior from start to 
finish, but rather, “it would be appropriate to say that automatic behavior due to the operation of 
enduring goals or motives is unintentional at the time but intentional in the sense that the choice 
of the behavior was made in the past, not the present” (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994, p. 82).  They 
noted, however, that implementation intentions seem to produce automatic behavior, even 
though these implementation intentions are, by definition, only a one time pairing of stimulus 
and response (i.e., the decision to associate “when the clock strikes 9” with “I will leave my 
apartment”).  This exception hinted that repeated association may not always be necessary to 
produce goal-directed automatic behavior (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994).   
This notion came to fruition following Bargh et al.’s (1996) finding on the perception-
behavior link, when new theories were born to explain primed behavior as the result of goal 
activation (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; Cesario, Plaks, & 
Higgins, 2006).  Even in Bargh et al.’s (1996) original piece, they conceded that automatic 
behavior would only occur if it was a reasonable response in the situation, allowing for the 
possibility that situational factors (like goals) could be relevant in producing the effect.  Based on 
the assumption that goals are stored in the same way as any other concept, and that they therefore 
could be activated automatically, the new accounts posited (1) that automatic behavior may be 
mediated by goals, rather than a direct response to the stimulus (as in Bargh et al., 1996), and (2) 
that these goals may arise suddenly in the presence of relevant stimuli, rather than requiring 
4 
 
previous conscious association (as in Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994).  For instance, one 
may develop an affiliation goal in the presence of another person, even if that person is a stranger 
– meaning it would be impossible to have previously associated that goal with them.  
Experiments bore out this hypothesis.  When primed with a cooperation goal in a novel task, 
participants indeed behaved more cooperatively despite no prior association between the goal 
and the situation (Bargh et al., 2001).   In fact, participants showed near identical levels of 
cooperation when primed with cooperation, explicitly instructed to cooperate, or both, 
demonstrating that such priming can indeed function as a goal (Bargh et al., 2001).  Furthermore, 
primed participants reported similar levels of intended cooperation as their unprimed, control 
condition counterparts, despite higher levels of enacted cooperation.  This indicates that goal-
directed behavior can be produced automatically, without any conscious awareness of the goal or 
intent to engage in the behavior, and does not require a concurrent conscious goal to exert its 
effect.  Finally, the researchers showed that primed goals produce escalating effects over time 
until satisfaction (experiment 3) and persist across obstacles (experiment 4) and interruptions 
(experiment 5; Bargh et al., 2001).  These results indicate that primed goals function in very 
much the same way as do conscious goals (Förster, Liberman, & Higgins, 2005). 
Cesario et al. (2006) furthered the idea of primes acting as goals by framing these effects 
as motivated preparation to interact with the target stimulus, especially when that stimulus is a 
person or category of people (e.g., elderly people in Bargh et al., 1996).  Cesario et al. took issue 
with the direct expression tenet of the perception-behavior link; that is, that perception 
automatically activates representations of behaviors ascribed to the target group, regardless of 
their relevance or appropriateness for the perceiver.  They argued that the perceiver’s behavior 
should be informed by their attitudes towards the target and what would be the most adaptive 
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way to interact with the target – as they put it, “one does not respond to slow enemies and slow 
friends with the same behavior” (Cesario et al., 2006, p. 895).  The question became: do people 
respond to primes with identical behavior (perception-behavior link, Bargh et al., 1996) or with 
interactional behavior (motivated preparation, Cesario et al., 2006)?  Cesario and colleagues 
tested this question by priming participants with the category gay men1, a group with distinct 
stereotypes and subject to widespread disapproval and prejudice.  A direct expression 
(perception-behavior link) response to this category would be passive behavior, but a motivated 
preparation response would be hostility.  As predicted, participants primed with gay men showed 
increased hostility, not passivity. 
An important distinction between the goal activation account and the perception-behavior 
link by how activation rises or falls over time.  The perception-behavior link would predict each 
encounter with the stimulus to increase activation of the concept (Bargh, 1990; Bargh et al., 
1996), but goal activation models predict that an opportunity to achieve the goal would satiate it 
and lead to diminished, even inhibited, activation of the concept (Förster et al., 2005).  In testing 
the motivated preparation account, Cesario et al. demonstrated this decrease in accessibility after 
a satiation opportunity, strengthening their claim that automatic behavior results from goals, not 
the direct expression of primed stereotypes. 
It is important to note that the perception-behavior link and the goal activation account 
are not mutually exclusive.  Researchers of both theories readily acknowledge the other 
account’s legitimacy and probable existence under the right circumstances.  Bargh, an early 
scholar of the auto-motive model (1990) and perception-behavior link (et al., 1996), has also 
                                                 
1 Despite drawing extensively from Bargh et al.’s 1996 study, Cesario et al. explained that the elderly/African-
American categories were inappropriate tests of the theory because both the direct expression account and the 
preparation to interact account would predict slower/hostile behavior. 
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written about goal-directed automatic behavior (et al., 2001).  In their premiere article on the 
motivated preparation account, Cesario et al. did not disparage earlier models as untrue, but 
rather suggested that a motivational model was more complete and adaptive when the target is a 
social object (i.e., people) and direct expression models could suffice for non-social objects.  
Similarly, we do not intend the present meta-analysis to test or disprove either theory, but rather 
to identify their relative domains and effect strengths. 
Goal Theory 
  As mentioned earlier, goals and perceptions have unique patterns of activation over time.  
Perception-related accessibility fades rapidly but is reactivated by any re-exposure to the 
construct, while the accessibility of goal-related constructs behaves in an almost opposite manner 
(Bargh et al., 2001; Cesario et al., 2006; Förster et al., 2005).  Goal-related accessibility escalates 
over time until an opportunity for satiation occurs.  Upon satiation, goal-related accessibility 
plummets, and may even be inhibited, falling below levels of activation for no-goal control 
groups.  By comparison, no-goal control groups experience an encounter with the “goal” stimuli 
as just another source of activation and that helps maintain accessibility over time (Bargh et al., 
2001; Förster et al., 2005).  Finally, for goals, the level of accessibility during goal pursuit and 
the level of inhibition post-satiation are proportional to motivation, but no such parallel has been 
documented (or is logical) for perception-only accounts (Förster et al., 2005).  Given the 
assumption that automatic behaviors are stored and accessible in the same way as any other 
mental construct (Bargh et al., 1996), the same hallmarks can differentiate goal-directed from 
direct expression automatic behavior (Cesario et al., 2006; Förster et al., 2005). 
Because perceptual and goal-related effects can be distinguished by their pattern of 
activation over time, many researchers include “filler” tasks in their procedures (for further 
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discussion, see Bargh et al., 2001).  These tasks occur after the priming task but before the 
dependent measure of interest, and serve to put some time between the activation of the concept 
and the assessment of its outcomes.  Filler tasks take a variety of forms, including copying 
figures (Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004), solving math problems (Kim, 2011), or drawing 
one’s family tree (Bargh et al., 2001; Hart & Albarracín, 2009).  Despite this variance, filler 
tasks can be defined by one characteristic: relevance to the primed concept or goal.  In a 
perception-behavior paradigm, a relevant filler task could serve as additional activation, 
increasing both the accessibility of the concept and its eventual outcome on the dependent 
measure of interest (Bargh et al., 2001; Förster et al., 2005).  In a goal-activation paradigm, any 
filler task that could be used to satisfy the goal (e.g., a word search task after an achievement 
goal) will cause goal satiation and goal-related construct inhibition during the dependent measure 
of interest (Bargh et al., 2001; Cesario et al., 2006).  Therefore, filler tasks can be used to 
differentiate perceptual from goal-driven effects by comparing the rise and fall of these effects 
over time. 
 One component of motivation to achieve goals is the goal’s expectancy (Förster et al., 
2005; Locke & Latham, 2002).  Expectancy is the perceived probability of achieving the goal, 
and is closely related to task difficulty such that more difficult tasks usually have lower 
expectancy.  When experimentally manipulated, goal expectancy seems to increase participants’ 
motivation to achieve the goal (Förster et al., 2005; Locke & Latham, 2002).  In accordance with 
goal theory, this motivation translates into goal-related accessibility such that expectancy is 
positively associated with accessibility.  In their experiments, Förster et al. found no difference 
in pre-satiation accessibility or post-satiation inhibition between participants in the no-goal 
control condition and those in the low expectancy goal condition; only those in the high 
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expectancy goal showed distinct escalating accessibility and post-satiation inhibition (2005).  
This pattern suggests a positive linear association between expectancy and goal-related 
accessibility, including automatic behaviors.  This assertion regarding goal expectancy is 
supported by Locke and Latham’s (2002) theory paper; however, they distinguish between goal 
expectancy and task expectancy.  While the goal expectancy is the perceived likelihood of 
achieving the goal, the task expectancy is the actual difficulty of the task, which has an inverse 
curvilinear association with performance (Locke & Latham, 2002). 
 Another critical component of goal motivation is the value of attaining the goal.  
Intuitively, participants are believed to be more motivated to achieve goals that hold great 
objective or personal value.  While personal value is hard to manipulate, the objective value of 
experimental tasks is easily altered by differing the compensation awarded to participants based 
on their performance.  Förster et al. (2005) conducted such an experiment, offering some 
participants $1 to find a target in a search task and others only $0.05.  Goal-related accessibility 
escalated pre-satiation and was inhibited post-satiation for participants in the $1 condition, but 
not for those in the $0.05 condition or no-goal control groups.  These results indicated that goal 
value, like goal expectancy, is an important component in determining motivation and the 
subsequent automatic goal-pursuit behaviors (Förster et al., 2005). 
 Goal expectancy and goal value show strong effects on their own, but evidence suggests 
that they actually interact to inform goal motivation.  In another experiment, Förster et al. (2005) 
manipulated both components at once in a 2 (high and low goal value) X 2 (high and low 
expectancy) design, with a no-goal control.  Intuitively, the high value/high expectancy condition 
should produce most goal-directed accessibility and the low value/low expectancy condition the 
least, but what about the mixed conditions?  If one component is outweighs the other, there 
9 
 
would be clear differences between these conditions, but if they combine into a composite 
indicator, the two conditions should produce similar results.  Results confirmed that the 
high/high combination produced the clearest pattern of goal activation, with much greater pre-
satiation escalation of accessibility and post-satiation inhibition.  The low/low condition rarely 
differed from the no-goal control group.  It seems a goal people are unlikely to attain, that would 
not give much reward even if they did, is hardly a goal at all.  Finally, consistent with a 
combination theory, the two mixed conditions were in between the high/high and low/low 
extremes, and did not significantly differ from each other.  This underscores the importance of 
the value X expectancy interaction; a deficiency in either leads to a decrease in motivation that 
the other component cannot singly overcome.  This is a logical mechanism: a goal with no value 
is not worth attaining, even if it would be easy to do so, and an impossible goal is not worth 
pursuing, no matter how attractive the rewards would be.  It would not be adaptive to expend 
energy and resources on worthless or pointless goal striving. 
Replication Crisis 
Behavioral priming has come under fire in recent years for failure to replicate, and in fact 
has become a favorite poster child for the so-called “replication crisis” (Cesario, 2014).  Doyen, 
Klein, Pichon, and Cleeremans (2012) were only able to replicate Bargh et al.’s (1996) ground-
breaking finding on walking speed when experimenters were led to believe their participants 
would walk more slowly; without this expectancy effect, there was no difference between 
participants primed with the concept elderly or not.  Harris, Coburn, Rohrer, and Pashler (2013) 
attempted to replicate two of Bargh et al.’s (2001) successful experiments (Experiment 1: 
achievement prime/neutral prime, and Experiment 3: achievement prime/neutral prime X filler 
task/no filler task) on achievement primes increasing performance on a word search.  Not only 
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were they unable to replicate either results, but their group means were either virtually identical 
or in the opposite of the predicted direction (p = ns; Harris et al., 2013)!     
These and other failures to replicate foundational studies in the field cast doubt on the 
very existence of priming, but some authors have advised caution in overestimating the meaning 
of a few failed attempts.  Cesario (2014) wrote about the importance of individual differences, 
and how priming’s infancy as a field makes it difficult to know which components of a study are 
necessary to produce effects.  Backing his assertion is research showing that priming effects are 
malleable to factors like motivations and attitudes (Cesario et al., 2006), financial status (Aarts et 
al., 2004), time of day (Boland, Connell, & Vallen, 2013), type of self-construal (independent vs. 
interdependent; Bry, Follenfant, & Meyer, 2008), dispositional submissiveness (Van Capellen, 
Corneille, Cols, & Saroglou, 2011), prior contact with target category (Dijksterhuis, Aarts, 
Bargh, & Van Knippenberg, 2000), chronic self-consciousness (Hull, Slone, Meteyer, & 
Matthews, 2002), habits (Sheeran et al., 2005), and culture (Wheeler, Smeesters, & Kay, 2011).  
Furthermore, Bargh (2012) identified an internal focus of attention, or the chronic tendency to 
use internal states to guide behavior, as a key moderator in priming effects.  Given this variety of 
influences, it is possible that true effects obtained in one situation may not replicate in another 
due to an uncontrolled or yet-unknown moderator.   
Because of the great uncertainty that still surrounds priming, Cesario counseled patience.  
He argued that we should allow priming to mature as a field and identify more of these 
moderators before using a few ill-fated replication attempts to dismiss it all as Type I error 
(2014).  Similarly, Bargh argued that trying to directly replicate a handful of studies, whose 
success or failure may ride on unseen factors, was less informative than meta-analyses 
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overviewing the field as a whole (2012).  The current meta-analysis is a contribution such an 
overview, and an attempt to identify moderators as Cersario suggested. 
The Current Meta-Analysis 
 The current meta-analysis sought to estimate the mean effect size of behavioral priming, 
and to quantify publication bias and any potential decline effect, as well as the effects of 
moderators like goal expectancy (ease), filler tasks, goal value, and prime stimulus type (e.g., 
pictures versus words).  Several of our moderators of interest pose conflicting hypotheses, which 
we will investigate in an exploratory manner.  Increased expectancy (an easy dependent task) 
may increase effect sizes by making goals more attainable (Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 
2007), but decreased expectancy may increase effect sizes by increasing motivation (Locke & 
Latham, 2002).  Because priming may function by the perception-behavior link or by activating 
goals, one might expect filler tasks to diminish effect sizes (as perceptions fade; Bargh et al., 
2001) or to increase them (as goals escalate; Förster et al., 2007), and for goal value to be 
irrelevant (to perception; Bargh et al., 1996) or proportional to effect sizes (Förster et al., 2007).  
Since these two paths likely operate under different circumstances, it is worthwhile to explore 
any potential moderators that differentiate primes that function as goals from those which 
operation via the perception-behavior link.  Finally, specific primes (for review, see Weingarten 
et al., 2015) may have larger effect sizes because their meaning is more clear, or abstract primes 
may have larger effect sizes because their ambiguity allows for multiple paths of activation 
(Förster et al., 2007).  For instance, while a direct politeness prime only activates the concept of 
politeness, a disciplinarian prime may activate the concepts of politeness, quietness, and 
deference, activate the emotion of fear, and remind participants of the consequences for 
misdeeds, which could combine additively to reduce the likelihood of a participant interrupting 
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an experimenter far below the effect of politeness alone.  Given that multiple sources of 
activation seem to combine additively to increase activation above that of a single source (Bargh, 
Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986), it is not unreasonable to speculate that indirect primes may 
similarly lead to increased effect sizes by activating multiple channels. 
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Chapter 2: Method 
Literature Search 
We searched major databases as far back as possible and contacted authors in the field for 
unpublished reports.  Databases searched include PsycINFO, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, 
the ReproducibilityProjectOpenScienceFramework,PsychFileDrawer.Org, Communication 
Abstracts, Advances in Consumer Research (Proceedings of the Association for Consumer 
Research), the Foreign Doctoral Dissertations Database of the Center for Research Libraries 
(http://www.crl.edu), PubMed, the Education Resources Information Center (ERIC), and ZPID 
on the Databases of the Institute of Psychology Information for the German-Speaking Countries 
(http://www.zpid.de).  In PsycINFO, we used the search terms (prime OR priming OR primed 
OR automatic OR automatically OR nonconscious! OR incidental!) AND (behavior OR goal OR 
action OR motivation) NOT (“semantic prim!”) NOT (“affect! prim!”) AND 
me.exact(“Empirical Study”) AND pop.exact(“Human”).  We used the same string, minus the 
last two specifications, to search ProQuest Dissertations and the Theses database, and minus the 
last four for ERIC, Foreign Doctoral Dissertations, PubMed and ZPID.  We made 320 requests to 
authors for unpublished data, and sent requests to the listhosts of the Society for Personality and 
Social Psychology, the Society for Consumer Psychology, and the Society for Experimental 
Social Psychology.  To increase the likelihood of submission, we accepted anonymous data.  We 
concluded our search in June 2014.  In phase 1 of the search we checked all results for relevant 
experiments, and in phase 2, we screened the studies that made it through phase 1 for our 
inclusion criteria, which follow. 
Inclusion Criteria 
To be eligible, studies must include: 
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 an experimental manipulation in which participants are randomly assigned to priming 
conditions.   
 a non-opposite control group.  In order to assess the effect of the prime relative to a 
neutral baseline, studies must include a control or comparison group whose primed goal 
is not semantically opposed to the target group.  For example, a study with only two 
groups, one of which received action primes and the other of which received inaction 
primes, would not be eligible.  Eligible non-opposite control groups may involve neutral 
primes, nonsense primes, unrelated goal primes (e.g., action priming vs. God priming), or 
no task.  
 a visually-presented word or image prime with a clear meaning.  Primes could be directly 
or indirectly related to their intended goal, such as invoking the concept of honesty 
through words like truth (directly linked) or divine (God priming intended to evoke 
honest behavior; indirect).  Primes in the form of sounds, smells, or movements were 
excluded, as were primes whose intended goal was ambiguous (e.g., priming the color 
red).   
 incidental priming rather than overt directions.  The activation of the concept must be due 
to the prime activating a schema, not due to direct instruction from the experimenter to 
behave a certain way.  For example a study measuring length of time spent working on a 
puzzle after completing a scrambled sentence task priming achievement (or neutral) 
would be eligible, but a study measuring length of time spent working on a puzzle after 
being explicitly told (or not) to work until the puzzle was finished would not be eligible. 
 a behavioral dependent variable.  Outcome measures must assess enacted behavior, not 
intentions.  Dependent variables also cannot merely be measures of the accessibility of 
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the primed concept (e.g., an IAT).  When it was unclear whether a measure represented 
accessibility or true behavior, the research team discussed it together to reach a 
consensus.  
 adequate statistics from which to calculate the effect size (e.g., means and standard 
deviations or standard errors, F statistics, t statistics).  Unless otherwise reported, we 
assumed that all conditions had equal cell sizes and standard deviations.  If there was not 
enough information with which to calculate the effect size, we contacted the original 
authors for a more complete report. 
The research team discussed as a group and came to a consensus on any study whose eligibility 
was unclear. 
Moderator Coding 
In addition to the effect size, we coded several variables that could potentially moderate 
the priming effect, including prime type, goal expectancy, goal value and any manipulations 
thereof, filler task(s), type of control, type of dependent variable, and descriptive characteristics 
of the study.  The primary coding group established high interrater reliability (κ > .7), with the 
exceptions of goal value (87% agreement; κ  = .56).   
Prime type.  Priming stimuli were coded based on liminality, stimuli type, task type, 
dosage, goal content, and directness.  Primes could be subliminal (e.g., parafoveal images) or 
supraliminal (e.g., word completion tasks) and could take the form of words or pictures.  The 
task type refers to how the priming stimuli were delivered to the participants; common 
techniques involved scrambled sentence tasks, anagrams, and lexical decision tasks for words 
and foveal and parafoveal presentation for images.  The priming task could also be a writing 
prompt designed to evoke a goal.  The proportion of primes was also recorded as the ratio of 
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prime-related stimuli to total stimuli during the priming task; for example, priming achievement 
with the words win, bread, chair, goal, and window would have a 0.4 proportion of primes 
because two of the five words are priming stimuli and the others are fillers.  We coded the main 
goal suggested by the prime, as well as any secondary goals.  Finally, primes were categorized as 
either directly related to the outcome if the priming stimuli had an close and unambiguous 
semantic link to the action to be performed (e.g., using the prime slow and the outcome of 
walking speed) or as indirectled related if the link between prime and behavior required 
inference (e.g., using the prime elderly and the outcome of walking speed, and expecting that 
participants associate slow with elderly, as in Bargh et al., 1996). 
Goal expectancy.  Manipulations of goal expectancy, or the ease of achieving the goal, 
were coded to represent no manipulation, an increase in expectancy (the goal is easier to attain in 
one condition), or a decrease in expectancy (the goal is more difficult to attain in one condition).  
Manipulating goal expectancy, as coded here, could represent changes to objective difficulty of 
the task (see Locke & Latham, 2002), or altering participants perceptions of their likelihood of 
attaining the task, without manipulating the actual likelihood (e.g., Förster et al., 2005). 
Goal value and manipulations of goal value.  Goal value was coded in two ways: the 
relevance of the dependent measure to the primed goal and the personal importance to the 
participants of achieving the goal.  Dependent measures that would not necessarily provide 
satisfaction of the primed goal were coded as low value; whereas tasks that would completely 
fulfill the goal were coded as high value.  Dependent measures could also be coded as high value 
if they provided tangible benefits to the participants (e.g., monetary rewards) or if they pertained 
to personal values (e.g., expressing an attitude).  Tasks were coded as low value if they were 
unlikely to intrinsically motivate the participants (e.g., solving anagrams).  We also coded if the 
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goal value was manipulated across conditions (e.g., offering a greater monetary reward in one 
group than another). 
Filler task(s).  We coded for the presence of a filler task between the priming phase and 
the dependent measure(s).  Filler tasks must have been intended as a filler task; ineligible 
dependent measure(s) that occurred between the priming and the eligible dependent measure(s) 
were not coded as filler tasks.  If present, we coded filler tasks on their type, approximate length 
in minutes (when provided), and relevance to the primed goal.   
Type of control.  The control group was coded on its relationship to the experimental 
group(s).  The control condition could not be the opposite of the experimental condition, but 
could take several other forms including neutral or nonsense stimuli, priming a different goal 
unrelated to the experimental goal, or having no task. 
Type of dependent variable.  Dependent measures had to be behavioral in nature and 
were categorized by type.  Common types included task performance with scoreable answers 
(e.g., anagrams), persistence on a task, reaction time, consumption of food or drink, and enacted 
choices regarding products, spending, donations, volunteering, etc.  We also coded dependent 
variables on their flexibility, that is, how many solutions are possible.  Measures that could be 
solved with multiple answers or multiple strategies (e.g., puzzles) were coded as flexible, but 
measures with only one answer or one possible strategy were coded as inflexible (e.g., choosing 
a product).   
Descriptive characteristics.  In addition to the methodological factors described above, 
we also coded descriptive characteristics such as year, country, percent female per study, and 
source type (published article, dissertation, author manuscript, etc.).  We also recorded any 
funneled or non-funneled debriefing reported. 
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Meta-Analytic Strategy 
The research team coded eligible articles and recorded all effect sizes resulting from 
eligible group comparisons and eligible measures.  Effect sizes were calculated as (M1 – 
M2)/SDpooled.  Regardless of the original author’s hypotheses, we assumed all priming effects 
would be assimilative.  From that assumption, we determined which group would have a higher 
mean if the proposed effect were true and assigned that to be M1 while M2 came from the other 
group.  Usually this resulted in MTreatment – MControl, but in some cases (e.g., God priming 
expected to inhibit unethical behavior) it was reversed.  We also assumed homoscedasticity 
across groups in a study and therefore calculated SDpooled as a simple average of the sample 
standard deviations.  If there was not enough information to calculate the effect size directly 
(e.g., sample standard deviations not reported), we attempted to derive them from t or F statistics 
or confidence intervals and contacted the original authors when necessary.   
Effect sizes were weighted by their inverse variances via the Metafor package in R 
(Viechtbauer, 2010).  We computed the weighted mean effect size using both fixed and random 
effects models.  Random effects were calculated with a maximum-likelihood estimator.  We 
tested for heterogeneity with Cochran’s Q statistic, which weights each effect size’s squared 
deviation from the mean effect by its inverse variance, and quantified any heterogeneity with I2, 
which represents the proportion of the variance due to between-study variance as opposed to 
within-study variance (Higgins & Thompson, 2002; Huedo-Medina, Sánchez-Meca, Marín-
Martínez, & Botella, 2006). 
All eligible effect sizes were recorded from each study, meaning that we could not 
assume independence across all effect sizes.  Effect sizes from the same article likely had shared 
contributors of variance (e.g., location of the lab, ambient temperature, disposition of the 
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experimenter), and effect sizes from the same study may have even more similarities if multiple 
treatment groups were compared to the same control group.  To account for this, studies were 
used as level two variables in all meta-regressions, allowing a random intercept for each study. 
We looked for publication bias using funnel plots and trim and fill procedures, and a rank 
correlation and regression tests for funnel plot asymmetry (Begg & Mazumdar, 1994; Egger, 
Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997).  Funnel plots show the distribution of effect sizes around 
their mean against their standard error.  In theory, the observed effect sizes should be a 
representative sample of an underlying normal distribution of possible effect sizes.  If true, this 
would indicate that the observed effect sizes should be closest to their mean when their standard 
error is low and should deviate from it symmetrically as standard error increases.  However, if 
there is publication bias in the field, findings that deviate down from the mean (and are less 
likely to be statistically significant due to their smaller size) would be suppressed, leading to an 
asymmetrical gap in the lower left-hand corner of the plot.  Trim and fill procedures fill this gap 
with a mirror image of the lower right-hand corner (effect sizes far above their mean) and re-
estimates the mean to account for these effect sizes.  Egger et al.’s (1997) regression test 
provides a quantitative assessment of this asymmetry by regressing each point’s standard normal 
deviate (which they “defined as the odds ratio divided by its standard error,” p. 3) on its 
precision.  The z test on the intercept of this regression acts as a test of asymmetry; the further 
the intercept is from zero, the more asymmetrical the funnel plot is.  Begg and Mazumdar’s 
(1994) rank test derives from Kendall’s tau and is based on the assumption that effect sizes will 
be correlated with their variances if publication bias is present.  In the absence of bias, large 
variances would appear on both sides of the distribution and be associated with abnormally high 
and low effect sizes.  However, if non-significant p-values are selected out of the sample, the 
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points with large variances and small effect sizes will disappear, leaving only those with large 
variances and large effect sizes.  Finally, we used Vevea and Hedge’s (1995) procedure to 
compare the expected density plot of effect sizes if there were no publication bias against the 
observed density plot, and to compare a general linear model wherein effect sizes are weighted 
by their p-value (i.e., in which certain p-values are more likely than others) against an 
unweighted model.  If there is no publication bias, the weighted model should fit the data no 
better than the unweighted model.  However, in the presence of publication bias favoring 
significant effects, smaller p-values will have much larger weights than larger ones, and the 
model accounting for this bias will fit the data better than the unweighted model. 
Moderator tests were conducted using meta-regression in Metafor.  Moderators were 
tested as singly and in combination with other moderators to predict effect size.  Studies were 
used as a level two variable in all meta-regressions to account for nonindependence. 
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Chapter 3: Results 
We included 159 papers containing 264 studies (K) and 682 effect sizes (k).  Papers 
ranged in date from 1984 to 2015 and were a mix of published and unpublished sources.   
Country of origin varied across papers with the United States contributing the most papers 
(55%), but other countries also contributed, especially the Netherlands (13.46%), Canada 
(5.77%), the United Kingdom (5.38%), and Germany (5%).  See Table 1 for more descriptive 
information. 
Results indicate a moderate effect size of random effects d = 0.4220 (z = 21.1082, p < 
.0001, 95% CI [confidence interval] [0.3828, 0.4612]) and fixed effects d = 0.3870 (z = 34.6899, 
p < .0001, 95% CI [0.3651, 0.4088]).  Cochran’s Q rejected the null hypothesis of homogeneity 
for both models, Q(681) = 1964.1339, p < .0001.  Similarly, results indicated considerable 
heterogeneity in the random effects model, I2 = 66.77%.  
Publication Bias 
Funnel plots of the effect sizes appear fairly symmetrical to the naked eye (see Figures 1–
4); however, the rank test indicates asymmetry (τ = 0.1622, p < .0001), as does the regression test 
(random effects, z = 6.4511, p < .0001; fixed effects, z = 9.1925, p < .0001).  The trim and fill 
procedure on the random effects model2 indicated 132 missing studies in the lower left quadrant 
of the plot (SE = 17.0719) and recalculated the effect size to be d = 0.2661 (z = 11.8360, p < 
.0001).  Accounting for these studies increases the estimated heterogeneity in the data, I2 = 
76.92%, Q(813) = 3147.7037, p < .0001.  While it is undeniably concerning to have so many 
missing studies, we are still confident that a true effect of priming does exist given that the 
recalculated confidence interval around d does not contain zero (95% CI [0.2221, 0.3102]) and 
                                                 
2 Fixed effects model: 135 missing studies, SE = 17.0731; d = 0.2622, z = 25.0545, p < .0001, 95% CI [0.2417, 
0.2827]; Q(816) = 3175.6496, p < .0001. 
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the new d is similar to prior estimates (e.g., Weingarten et al., 2015).  The Vevea and Hedges 
(1995) procedure also indicated some publication bias, with the weighted model (log likelihood 
= -115.9) showing improvement over the unweighted model (-69.34; 2*difference = 93.03, df = 
11, p < .0001).  The density plot of these models showed fewer effect sizes than expected in the 
high p-value range and more than expected in the low p-value range (see Figure 5).  Taken 
together, this evidence clearly points towards some publication bias, but not enough to seriously 
question the existence of the priming effect. 
After examining publication bias in the sample as a whole, we split the data into directly 
and indirectly linked primes and tested separately for publication bias in each.  The directly 
linked subset indicated a mean effect size of d = 0.3368 (z = 11.6092, p < .0001, random effects; 
d = 0.3139, z = 18.7675, p < .0001, fixed effects).  These estimates are similar, albeit somewhat 
smaller, than the overall estimates.  Figures 6–9 show the funnel plots for this subset, calculated 
with random and fixed effects, and showing a reference line either at the estimated mean or at 
zero.  These funnel plots show subtle asymmetry on the lower left side, consistent publication 
bias driven by p-value.  Accordingly, the trim and fill procedure estimated 50 missing studies 
(SE = 11.2029) in this area, and re-estimated the effect size to be d = 0.1989 (z = 6.1232, p < 
.0001, random effects3).  The rank test also indicated asymmetry, τ = 0.1068 (p = .0063), as did 
the regression test (random effects: z = 4.1014, p < .0001; fixed effects: z = 5.2162, p < .0001).  
The density plot produced by the Vevea and Hedges (1995) procedure was similar to the ones for 
the entire data set, with systematically fewer small effect sizes and more large effect sizes 
observed than would be expected in the absence of bias (see Figure 10).  The model weighted by 
p-values had significantly better fit (log likelihood = -58.83) than the unweighted model (log 
                                                 
3 Fixed effects: 46 missing studies, SE = 11.1768, d = 0.2168, z = 13.6358, p < .0001 
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likelihood = -43.28; 2*difference = 31.1, df = 11, p < .0011).  Similar to the overall dataset, the 
analyses on the directly-linked primes converge to indicate some publication bias, but not 
enough to dismiss the entire effect as Type I error.  
The indirectly linked primes had considerably larger effect size estimates of d = 0.4896 (z 
= 18.1619, p < .0001, random effects; d = 0.4455, z = 29.7588, p < .0001, fixed effects).  Figures 
11–14 show the funnel plots of the indirectly linked primes with random or fixed effects and a 
reference line at the estimated mean or at zero.  The asymmetry in these plots is difficult to 
perceive with the naked eye, but the trim and fill procedure indicates 80 missing studies on the 
left side (SE = 12.8845, random effects4) and re-estimates the effect size to be a more modest d = 
0.3246 (z = 10.6575, p < .0001).  The rank and regression tests also indicated asymmetry 
consistent with publication bias driven by p-values (τ = 0.1750, p < .0001; random effects: z = 
4.6536, p < .0001; fixed effects: z = 7.5045, p < .0001).  The results of the Vevea and Hedges 
(1995) procedure were similar for these data as they were in the other analyses.  The density plot 
(Figure 15) showed fewer small observed effect sizes and more large observed effect sizes than 
chance would predict, and the weighted model (log likelihood = -67.61) fit the data better than 
the unweighted model (log likelihood = -33.42; 2*difference = 68.37, df = 11, p < .0001).  
Consistent with the other sets of analyses, this evidence points to undeniable publication bias 
among studies of indirectly linked primes, but the effect does not disappear when it is corrected. 
Moderator Analyses 
Moderators were first tested as single predictors in a simple meta-regression and then 
were tested in several multivariate meta-regressions.  Studies were used as level two variables in 
all meta-regressions.  Year and proportion of primes were scaled before analysis; all others were 
                                                 
4 Fixed effects: 87 missing studies (SE = 12.8674), d = 0.3041, z = 21.8222, p < .0001 
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not.  The two facets of goal value (personal importance of goal, relevance of task to goal) were 
combined into one composite variable of coded value for analyses.  See Table 2a for a full report 
of single-predictor, random effects analyses.  Table 2b presents the same analyses using fixed 
effects, but these analyses are not discussed at length in the text because the high heterogeneity 
in the data suggests that a random effects model is likely more appropriate.  All moderator 
analysis statistics in the text are from random effects analyses unless otherwise stated. 
Descriptive characteristics.  There were no significant differences in effect sizes across 
year or country in the random effects analyses, but both moderators showed significant 
differences in the fixed effects analyses.  There was a slight downward trend over time and the 
Netherlands, the UK, Canada, France, and the combination of countries represented in our 
“other” category had effects significantly higher than the intercept value of the United States’ 
effect (β0 = 0.3246, z = 22.0639, p < .0001).  Unpublished sources tended to have smaller effects 
than published sources in both the random (Δβ = -0.1412, z = -2.8243, p = .0047) and fixed (Δβ 
= -0.1882, z = -7.4141, p < .0001) analyses. 
Methodological features.  Liminality, control type, task flexibility, and presence of 
funneled debriefing were not significant predictors of effect size in the single-predictor meta-
regressions.  Proportion of primes5 was significant, indicating a slight increase in effect size as 
the proportion increases.  Most methods of priming were not significant, but a few stood out: 
scrambled sentence tasks, word searches, and having participants write about their own 
experiences each diminished the effect size compared to the intercept.    In contrast, almost all of 
the prime types significantly differed from their intercept (corresponding to stimuli words not 
associated with people).  Prime types6 that increased effect sizes above the intercept (β0 = 
                                                 
5 Also significant in fixed effects analyses. 
6 Results were similar in fixed effects analyses. 
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0.3630) included non-human pictures (Δβ = 0.3256), human pictures (Δβ = 0.2875), and unique 
primes from our “other” category (Δβ = 0.1594).  The only prime type that did not emerge as 
significant was words associated with people. 
Most primed goals/concepts were not significant predictors beyond the intercept 
(achievement; β0 = 0.3548, z = 8.1353, p < .0001), but a few were.  Helping/cooperation goals 
almost exactly doubled the intercept (Δβ = 0.3541), closely followed by impression-formation 
(Δβ = 0.3215) and consumption (Δβ = 0.3196).  Elderly primes nearly tripled effect sizes (Δβ = 
0.7410), whereas courage primes decimated them (Δβ = -1.1214).  The collection of unusual 
goals in our “other” category also increased effect size (Δβ = 0.1429), although this is hard to 
interpret.  These same goals, as well as failure, intimacy, and defensiveness, were also significant 
in the fixed effects analyses. 
Most dependent measures7 had similar effects (intercept: achievement task with scoreable 
right or wrong answer, β0 = 0.4020, z = 10.9139, p = .0009), but a few deviated.  Consumption 
tasks were associated with increased effect sizes (Δβ = 0.2398), as was the “other” category (Δβ 
= 0.2042), which is again difficult to interpret.  In contrast, approach tasks and certain puzzles 
were associated with dramatic decreases in effect size (respectively, Δβ = -1.1686; Δβ = -
0.5174). 
Theoretical Features.  Compared to when primes were directly linked to their outcomes 
(β0 = 0.3760, z = 10.5766, p < .0001), effect sizes were significantly larger (by close to 40%) 
when primes were indirectly linked8 (Δβ = 0.1430, z = 3.0860, p = .0020).  Coded value9 
significantly predicted effect size across experiments (Δβ = 0.0641).  When manipulated across 
                                                 
7 Results were similar in fixed effects analyses. 
8 Also significant in fixed effects analyses. 
9 Also significant in fixed effects analyses. 
26 
 
conditions within one experiment, decreasing goal value dramatically reduced effect sizes (Δβ = 
-0.5146), but increasing goal value did not significantly differ from the intercept.  It is worth 
noting, however, that the two manipulation categories had small ns compared to the 
nonmanipulated category (nonmanipulated n = 487, value reduced n = 29, value increased n = 
59).  The mere presence of a filler task did not predict differences in effect size, but the relevance 
of the filler task did.  Effect sizes on the outcome measure decreased as the filler task relevance 
increased (Δβ = -0.2886).  Neither was significant in the fixed effects analyses.  Effect sizes 
diminished when goal expectancy was manipulated, regardless of whether the task was made 
easier or harder (easier, Δβ = -0.1520; harder, Δβ = -0.2186).   
Predictive Models 
We collapsed across levels of certain moderators to simplify the model and eliminate 
overfitting.  To see the effect of theoretical and descriptive/methodological moderators working 
in concert, we fit seven regressions containing one theoretical moderator as the variable of 
interest and all descriptive and methodological moderators as covariates.  The results of these 
regressions on the variables of interest can be seen in Tables 3a (random effects) and 3b (fixed 
effects).  All results discussed in text are from the random effects models unless otherwise stated.   
Directly versus indirectly linked primes were not significantly different when tested with 
all covariates, but because the prime type “pictures” was defined as indirect, this model had 
considerable redundancy.  To account for this, we retested the model without the covariate of 
prime type.  This decreased the overall model fit (ΔAIC = -100.6397, ΔBIC = -90.9183), but 
restored the effect of direct versus indirect primes as significant such that indirect primes had 
larger effect sizes than direct primes did (Δβ = 0.2010, z = 2.7136, p < .0067).  This was 
consistent with the results of the single predictor model, suggesting a robust effect. 
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As in the single-predictor analyses, manipulations of value were only significant when it 
was manipulated downward (Δβ = -0.4634).  Coded value itself, when constant within an 
experiment, was not as straightforward.  In the random effects model, the intercept 
(corresponding to low value) was not significantly different from zero, but the coefficient for the 
high value condition was.  This was reversed in the fixed effects analyses, however, where the 
intercept was significant but the coefficient for the high value condition was not. 
In contrast to the findings of Weingarten et al. (2015), but consistent with the single-
predictor results, goal expectancy emerged as a significant predictor.  However, this finding 
offers little help in settling the debate over goal expectancy because it shows a decrease in 
predicted effect size whether goal expectancy is increased or decreased (increased: Δβ = -0.3035; 
decreased: Δβ = -0.2496).  These findings must be interpreted with caution, however, given that 
relatively few studies manipulated goal expectancy, leading to much smaller samples sizes (of 
contrast units k) in the manipulation conditions compared to the no-manipulation intercept (k = 
617). 
Motivation is believed to be a function of both goal value and goal expectancy (Förster et 
al., 2005), so we tested the interaction between value and manipulations of expectancy.  Not only 
were the interaction terms nonsignificant (ps > .37), but the intercept was nonsignificant (albeit 
close, β0 = 0.2299, z = 1.8506, p = .0642) and most of the main effects disappeared (ps > .09) as 
well.  The only remaining significant coefficient was that of increasing expectancy (Δβ = -
0.3406).     
The presence of an irrelevant filler task did not significantly modify the effect size 
estimate beyond the intercept (no filler) value of β0 = 0.3842, but the presence of a filler task 
relevant to the goal/concept significantly decreased effect sizes (Δβ = -0.3515).  The interaction 
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of filler task presence/relevance and coded value was only significant at the intercept level.  This 
lack of significance may be consistent with the goal-activation theory, but only to the extent of 
goal persistence, not goal escalation. 
In all of the moderator-covariate models, unpublished status predicted lower effect sizes 
and the use of consumption or health as the goal and/or pictures as the priming stimuli both 
predicted larger effect sizes.  Most models had a few other covariates reach significance as well, 
but only those three were consistent across models.  This is consistent with a model including 
only descriptive and methodological features (Table 4). 
When all theoretical moderators10 are included in one regression11 (β0 = 0.4007, z = 
8.1113, p < .0001), only a few emerge as significant predictors.  Using indirect primes increases 
the effect (Δβ = 0.1260), whereas manipulating the goal value downward (Δβ = -0.5213), 
manipulating goal expectancy upward (Δβ = -0.2624), and the presence of a relevant filler task 
(Δβ = -0.4218) all diminish the effect.  In the fixed effects model, these significant coefficients 
are joined by the interaction term for high value goals and manipulating expectancy upward, 
which increased effects (Δβ = 0.2893), and the presence of an irrelevant filler task (Δβ = -
0.0929), which decreased effects.  Statistics for all moderators are available in Table 5a (random 
effects) and Table 5b (fixed effects).   
When all descriptive and methodological variables12 are added as covariates to the 
theoretical moderators in one regression13 (β0 = 0.2905, z = 2.2397, p = .0251), several variables 
                                                 
10 Directness of the prime, manipulations of value, composite value [high/low], manipulations of expectancy, 
interaction of composite value and manipulation of expectancy, filler task presence/absence and relevance to goal, 
interaction of composite value and filler task presence/absence and relevance to goal. 
11 Random effects presented in text; fixed effects available in Table 5b. 
12 Year, publication status, country, liminality, proportion of primes, control type, goal(s) primed, dependent 
measure category, presence of funneled debriefing, task flexibility, and modality of prime.  Another model was 
tested with all these predictors and method of priming, but method of priming was not significant at any level and 
the model fit statistics improved when it was removed (ΔAIC = -4.1168; ΔBIC = -19.6943). 
13 Random effects presented in text; fixed effects available in Table 5. 
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exerted a significant effect.  Indirect primes were again more effective than direct primes (Δβ = 
0.2020), consistent with the results of other models.  Also consistent were the effects of 
manipulating the goal value downward (Δβ = -0.4469), manipulating goal expectancy upward 
(Δβ = -0.3601), and the presence of a relevant filler task (Δβ = -0.6077), all of which again 
diminished effect sizes.  Publication bias remains a concern, as unpublished status predicted a 
sizeable drop in effect size (Δβ = -0.1914).  Of the methodological characteristics, using a goal 
related to opinions of the self or others (coded category containing autonomy, efficacy, and 
impression formation goals) predicted a spike in effect size (Δβ = 0.2790), as did using a flexible 
dependent measure (Δβ = 0.1699) or a consumption (Δβ = 0.4286) or product choice (Δβ = 
0.7401) dependent task.  Statistics for all moderators are available in Table 6a (random effects) 
and Table 6b (fixed effects). 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
The current meta-analysis surveyed every record we could find of behavioral dependent 
measures in response to a non-affective, incidentally primed goal or concept with a non-opposite 
control goal, resulting in 159 eligible papers containing 264 eligible studies (K) and 682 eligible 
effect sizes (k).  These papers were published and unpublished, from the U.S. and other 
countries, and spanned from 1984 to 2015.  They used a wide variety of goals (e.g., achievement, 
socialization, consumption, health, etc.), priming methods (e.g., scrambled sentence tasks, word 
completions, word searches, (para)foveal presentation, reading/writing tasks, etc.), priming 
stimuli (words and pictures with direct or indirect relationships to the goal), non-opposite control 
conditions (neutral primes, nonsense primes, non-opposite goal primes, no task, etc.), and 
dependent measures (achievement or persistence on tasks like anagrams or puzzles, motor 
behaviors like sitting or standing, enacted allocation of time or money, choice of product, etc.).  
Studies could contain supra- or subliminal stimuli; a relevant, irrelevant, or no filler task between 
priming and the dependent measure; flexible or inflexible dependent tasks, and goals with high 
or low, manipulated or stable value and/or expectancy.  All eligible comparisons were coded on 
these and other moderators and all eligible effect sizes were included in analyses, using study as 
a level two variable to account for non-independence between effect sizes from the same study. 
Weighted mean estimates indicate a moderate effect size of d = 0.4220 (random effects) 
and d = 0.3870 (fixed effects), but with moderate to large heterogeneity (I2 = 66.77%).  There 
was also considerable evidence of publication bias (132 missing studies), but the trim and fill 
procedure’s recalculated d = 0.2661 and 95% CI [0.2221, 0.3102] nonetheless indicate a real 
effect.  The published effects of behavioral priming are at worst inflated, not spurious.   
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Theoretical descriptive, and methodological features of the studies were subjected to 
single and multiple regressions with study as a level two variable.  Perhaps the most interesting 
result is that of direct versus indirect linkage between primes and outcomes.  There were 
competing hypotheses regarding linkage; it could be that direct primes are more effective 
because they offer clearer prototypes of the desired outcome behavior, or it could be that indirect 
primes were more effective because they could capitalize on multiple channels of activation.  
Equally interesting is the null hypothesis, that somehow direct primes and indirect primes could 
accomplish the same effects.  Despite the multitude of possibilities, our results are clear, strong, 
and consistent: indirect primes lead to larger effect sizes than direct primes.  In the single-
predictor regression and the multiple regressions of one moderator with all the covariates, all the 
moderators with no covariates, and the full model, indirect primes emerged with a significant and 
sizable positive coefficient each time.  While an experimental test is of course necessary to 
establish causation, we feel the statistical evidence presented here is a strong foundation in favor 
of indirect primes. 
Goal value is theorized (and intuitively assumed) to predict effect size via motivation to 
achieve, and was a highly effective predictor in past research (Weingarten et al., 2015), but it 
was not as robust in the present meta-analysis.  Coded value was indeed positively associated 
with effect size in the single-predictor regression, but its predictive performance in other models 
was surprisingly lackluster.  When it was tested as a moderator along with the descriptive and 
methodological covariates, the intercept of the model failed to reach significance, but the 
coefficient for value did.  Although troubling that an intercept would be nonsignificant, this is 
may be a statistical artifact.  Coded value (along with all the other covariates) is at its lowest 
point at the intercept, explaining the corresponding low effect size.  That the intercept was not 
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statistically significantly different from zero actually highlights the importance of goal value – 
when the goal is of extremely low value, people are unmotivated to pursue it and outcomes 
suffer.  Supporting this theory is coded value’s significant positive coefficient, indicating that 
effect sizes rise when value does.  Goal value was not significant when combined with other 
covariates, but theory insists that it should interact with expectancy (Förster et al., 2005).  
Despite coded value’s poor predictive utility, measures of goal value manipulations were 
significant in all models.  Specifically, when goal value was manipulated downward, effect sizes 
followed (manipulating value upward was never significant).  It is unclear why manipulation of 
value within a study would emerge as predictive but variations of value across studies would not, 
especially because the current investigation only used comparisons of goal-prime versus control-
prime conditions; if value was also manipulated in a study, this would result in multiple contrast 
units, not in mismatched goal value within contrast units.  One possible explanation is that the 
delineation of high versus low value conditions required experimenters to create scenarios more 
extreme along the spectrum of value than those scenarios used in studies in which goal value was 
a constant.  This would imply that it really is goal value driving effect size, but that this effect 
was ironically captured better by our coding of value manipulation than it was by our coding of 
goal value itself. 
We set out to test expectancy in hopes of supporting one or more preexisting theory, but 
our results seem to muddy the issue even further.  Locke and Latham (2002) and Förster et al. 
(2005) agree that goal expectancy should be positively associated with goal-related accessibility.  
Assuming that automatic behaviors are stored as any other construct and are susceptible to 
accessibility (Bargh et al., 1996), this should translate to a positive association between 
expectancy and effect size of behavioral priming.  Locke and Latham also suggest that task 
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expectancy (difficulty) should be inversely curvilinearly associated with performance (2002).  
Neither of these theories wholly explain what we found.  Manipulating expectancy upward (e.g., 
making the task more difficult) was negatively related to effect size in every model.  In the 
single-predictor regression and single theoretical moderator regression, manipulating expectancy 
downward was also negatively related to effect size.  These results are puzzling, because they 
contradict established theory.  It could be that expectancy as we coded it was closer to task 
expectancy than goal expectancy, and thus should form an inverse curvilinear function where 
performance suffers at the extremes and peaks in the middle (Locke & Latham, 2002).  The 
current data provide no evidence of a central peak; however, the variable was coded as 
manipulation of expectancy, not expectancy itself.  Given that deliberate manipulation of a 
variable tends to create more extreme forms of it than occur sans manipulation, it is possible that 
the effect sizes caught in these codes are those from the far ends of that inverse curvilinear 
distribution.  Further research is needed to clarify this issue, and we encourage future researchers 
of priming effects to include expectancy manipulations and grow the pool of effect sizes to 
analyze.  We also encourage future meta-analysts to code expectancy itself, not just manipulation 
thereof, despite having firsthand knowledge of how difficult this can be to judge. 
The interaction of goal value and expectancy was not significant in the full model or a 
model of all theoretical moderators without any covariates.  This defies established theory, which 
says goal value and expectancy combine to determine motivation and accessibility (Förster et al., 
2005), which should also inform performance.  When this interaction and the two main effects 
were tested with the covariates but no other theoretical moderators, the only significant effect 
that emerged was the main effect that manipulating expectancy upward diminishes effect sizes.  
Perhaps this model’s sole theoretical survivor is the clue to why this interaction does not work, 
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despite its backing in theory.  As discussed above, expectancy did not conform to its theoretical 
expectations, perhaps because it was coded only in terms of manipulation.  If these 
manipulations resulted in particularly extreme levels of high or low expectancy, in the tails of the 
distribution where performance suffers, it is likely that it would not combine in the normal way 
with value, which was coded on its own merits rather than in terms of manipulation only.  Given 
these lackluster findings, we reiterate our call for future researchers to include manipulations of 
expectancy and for future meta-analysts to code expectancy itself. 
The presence and relevance of filler tasks also has important theoretical implications.  In 
the single-predictor regression, the mere presence (vs. absence) a filler task was not significant, 
but filler task relevance was significantly and negatively associated with effect size.  This pattern 
makes theoretical sense.  Perception-behavior and goal-activation accounts have opposing 
predictions for filler tasks, and both mechanisms are likely at work in this data.  This conflict 
may have overshadowed any possible main effect of filler task mere presence.  However, once 
filler tasks are examined in terms of their relevance to a primed goal, a pattern emerged.  The 
intercept of this model (where filler tasks are present but irrelevant to the primed goal) is much 
larger than the overall estimate, likely because the irrelevant filler is causing goal tension to build 
and focusing activation on the goal-related task to come (Bargh et al., 2001; Förster et al., 2005).  
As filler tasks become more relevant, effect size diminishes drastically.  This is in line with goal 
theory’s expectation that goal satiation will lead to diminished accessibility and even inhibition 
of goal-related constructs, impairing performance on a second goal-related task (Bargh et al., 
2001; Förster et al., 2005).  This pattern of results continued into the multiple regressions, where 
relevant filler tasks decreased effect sizes and irrelevant filler tasks were not significant across all 
multiple regression models.  This offers strong support for post-satiation inhibition.  It is strange 
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that irrelevant filler tasks were nonsignificant rather than a boost to effect sizes, given that they 
should facilitate goal escalation; however, it is possible that the conflicting effects within the 
data of the perception-behavior link and goal-activation continued to obscure any such effect.  
Finally, we attempted to replicate Weingarten et al.’s (2015) previous findings regarding an 
interaction between filler task and goal value.  They found that filler tasks interacted with value 
such that, when the goal had high value, priming effects persisted across irrelevant filler tasks 
and only diminished if the filler task included an opportunity to satiate the goal, but when goal 
value is low, priming effects diminished regardless of the relevance of the filler task.  These 
findings indicate that goal value determines which mechanism applies; high value goals lead to 
goal-activation patterns whereas low value goals lead to perception-behavior patterns 
(Weingarten et al., 2015).   We were unable to replicate this interaction with value in any model, 
but as discussed above, our goal value variable defied many theory-based expectations.  Due to 
these apparent abnormalities, we feel that our findings represent ambiguity rather than nuance 
and leave it to future researchers to replicate or disprove Weingarten et al.’s assertion. 
We analyzed descriptive and methodological in the same way as the theoretical 
moderators, with surprisingly few significant results.  Country and year were significant in some 
fixed effects analyses, but given the heterogeneity of the data, their lack of significance in the 
random effects analyses (single and multiple) is likely more telling.  Effect sizes from 
unpublished studies were consistently smaller than their published counterparts in all models, 
which is consistent with the statistical evidence of publication bias in this field.  Using a greater 
proportion of primes was positively associated with effect size in the single regressions, but this 
effect disappeared when it was used as a covariate among other predictors.  Liminality, type of 
control group used, and presence of funneled debriefing were not significant predictors in any 
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models.  Having participants write about their own experiences as the priming task looked 
promising in the single-predictors regressions, but was no longer significant in the larger model.  
Task flexibility showed the opposite pattern; it was a significant covariate in the full model, but 
was not significant in the single-predictor regression. 
Because many priming objects were eligible for inclusion, we were able to draw 
comparisons between them.  The effect size resulting from words with a metaphorical connection 
to the goal did not appear to alter the effect size compared to words with a more direct link, but 
using pictures rather than words had a large, consistent, and significant effect, often doubling or 
even tripling the intercept value (which, in single predictor tests, corresponds to directly linked 
word primes).  Pictures increased effect sizes in the single-predictor regression and as a covariate 
in every test of theoretical moderators14, usually by a great deal (β ≥ 0.3765).  In the interests of 
parsimony and power, most analyses merged the human and non-human pictures categories; 
however, in initial tests, both reached significance.  Although an experimental comparison of 
words and pictures is necessary to establish causality, this finding offers strong correlational 
evidence that pictures may be more effective stimuli than words.  Using an unusual prime that 
we coded as “other” also increased effect sizes in most models, but not in every one.  This 
finding is difficult to interpret because of the wide variety of stimuli included in that category, 
but taken along with the robust effect of pictures, it may indicate a reward available to 
researchers who use novel and creative primes rather than the more traditional word primes 
(which comprised 64.90% of the current sample). 
Many different dependent variables were coded, but very few deviated from the intercept 
(which, in the single-predictor regression, corresponded to achievement tasks).  The catch-all 
                                                 
14 This variable was dropped in the model containing all theoretical moderators and covariates because of 
redundancy with  the direct vs indirect variable. 
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category of “other” rose to significance, increasing effect size in the single-predictor regression, 
but did not reemerge in the full model with all moderators and covariates.  Conversely, product 
choice measures emerged to increase effect size in the full model, but not in the single-predictor 
regression.  Consumption tasks, however, increased effect sizes in both the single-predictor and 
full regression models.  They did not serve as a significant covariate in the single moderator 
tests, but their emergence in the other two models is enough to say they warrant further research.  
They may be particularly sensitive to priming effects and/or particularly well suited targets of 
automatic behavior.  Aside from consumption, no other tasks stood out as particularly 
remarkable.  This gives researchers a large amount of freedom in selecting the dependent 
measures they deem fit without fear of it negatively affecting the effect size they can expect. 
In the single-predictor regression each type of primed goal/concept coded was examined 
separately, and a few yielded significant results.  Helping/cooperation, impression formation, 
consumption, and elderly goals/concepts each increased the effect size, many of them 
dramatically.  The “other” category was also significant, although this is difficult to interpret due 
to its variety.  In later models, some levels of goal/concept were merged to increase parsimony 
and eliminate categories with very few members (e.g., biographical reading about another 
person, k = 2).  After this merge, in the full model, only the category containing autonomy, 
efficacy, and impression formation goals significantly increased effect sizes.   
After reviewing the effects of a wide variety of theoretical, descriptive, and 
methodological moderators, we have a few recommendations for future priming researchers.  
First, and perhaps most excitingly, is the finding that indirect primes predict larger effect sizes 
than direct primes.  Therefore, we recommend using indirect primes whenever possible.  We also 
recommend that researchers create experiments with direct and indirect priming conditions to 
38 
 
address the question of causality in this effect.  It is tempting to say that indirect primes cause 
larger effects (and we have certainly entertained the notion in this article), but such assertions are 
best reserved until there is empirical evidence to support them.  We also recommend the use of 
novel stimuli, particularly images, whenever possible, as these mediums consistently produced 
larger effect sizes than more traditional, word-based primes.  Researchers should also investigate 
the use of consumption tasks as dependent variables, as this feature also predicted larger effect 
sizes.  Aside from these, however, many of the factors we examined did not have a strong or 
significant influence on effect size, leading us to conclude that fretting over details like 
liminality, type of control group, task flexibility, or exact proportion of primes is not warranted.  
Researchers should feel confident designing the experiment that best serves their hypothesis and 
not be weighed down with concerns over minute methodological details. 
In conclusion, we assert that behavioral priming effects are not spurious Type I errors, 
despite several failed replications.  These effects are subject to publication bias and are likely 
inflated, but statistically correcting for such inflation still leaves a respectable effect size of about 
d = 0.27.  An examination of multiple descriptive and methodological moderators indicates wide 
leeway for researchers design experiments without fear of losing their effects, but we have also 
presented evidence that indirect primes outperform direct primes and that novel priming stimuli 
offer advantages over more traditional stimuli.  Furthermore, some of our results indicate how 
behavioral priming effects adhere to goal theory, but these results are incomplete and 
inconclusive, requiring the continued attention of other researchers in the field to solidify how 
behavioral priming fits into preexisting theories of perception and goal pursuit.  
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Chapter 5: Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 
 
Sample Characteristics 
 
Variable  Type of Statistic   Study (K) Summary    Units (k) Summary 
Descriptive characteristics        
Year  M (SD) 2007.52  (5.12)  2007.38 (5.51) 
  Md 2007   2009  
Country  US Count (%) 143  (54.17)  396 (57.31) 
  Non-US Count (%) 91  (34.47)  284 (41.1) 
Publication status  Published Count (%) 214  (81.06)  519 (75.11) 
  Unpublished Count (%) 53  (20.08)  168 (24.31) 
Theoretical moderators        
Directness of the prime  Direct Count (%)    302 (43.7) 
  Indirect Count (%)    389 (56.3) 
Manipulations of value  Nonmanipulated Count (%)    487 (70.48) 
  Decreased Count (%)    29 (4.2) 
  Increased Count (%)    59 (8.54) 
Coded value  Low Count (%)    326 (47.18) 
  High Count (%)    179 (25.9) 
Manipulations of expectancy  Nonmanipulated Count (%)    617 (89.29) 
  Decreased Count (%)    28 (4.05) 
  Increased Count (%)    44 (6.37) 
Filler task presence and relevance  Absent Count (%)    560 (81.04) 
  Irrelevant Count (%)    96 (13.89) 
  Relevant Count (%)    23 (3.33) 
Methodological features        
Liminality  Subliminal Count (%) 57  (21.59)  135 (19.54) 
  Supraliminal Count (%) 208  (78.79)  556 (80.46) 
Proportion of Primes  M (SD) 0.83  (0.23)  0.82 (0.23) 
  Md 1   1  
Control type  Neutral Count (%) 168  (63.64)  429 (62.08) 
  Other Count (%) 78  (29.55)  203 (29.38) 
Funneled Debriefing  Absent Count (%) 138  (52.27)  329 (47.61) 
  Present Count (%) 117  (44.32)  328 (47.47) 
Task Flexibility  Inflexible Count (%) 131  (49.62)  315 (45.59) 
  Flexible Count (%) 136  (51.52)  365 (52.82) 
Modality of Prime  Words Unrelated to People Count (%) 139  (52.65)  358 (51.81) 
  Words Related to People Count (%) 12  (4.55)  34 (4.92) 
  Pictures Count (%) 33  (12.5)  56 (8.1) 
  Other Count (%) 54  (20.45)  124 (17.95) 
 
Note.  Theoretical moderators are not displayed at the study (K) level because they may have been manipulated within some of 
those studies. 
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Table 2 
 
Results of Single-Predictor Meta-Regressions 
 
 Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
 (Δ)β SE z p 95% CI  (Δ)β SE z p 95% CI 
β0 Year Int. 0.4608 0.0241 19.1440 0.0000 [0.4136, 0.508]  0.3912 0.0113 34.7595 0.0000 [0.3692, 0.4133] 
Δβ Year -0.0454 0.0254 -1.7876 0.0738 [-0.0951, 0.0044]  -0.0328 0.0115 -2.8486 0.0044 [-0.0554, -0.0102] 
Δβ Pub Int (Published) 0.4892 0.0260 18.8230 0.0000 [0.4383, 0.5402]  0.4356 0.0130 33.4058 0.0000 [0.41, 0.4612] 
Δβ Unpublished -0.1412 0.0500 -2.8243 0.0047 [-0.2391, -0.0432]  -0.1882 0.0254 -7.4141 0.0000 [-0.2379, -0.1384] 
β0 Country: US 0.4182 0.0323 12.9557 0.0000 [0.3549, 0.4814]  0.3246 0.0147 22.0639 0.0000 [0.2958, 0.3534] 
Δβ Country: Canada 0.0234 0.1051 0.2228 0.8237 [-0.1826, 0.2294]  0.1043 0.0502 2.0789 0.0376 [0.006, 0.2026] 
Δβ Country: Netherlands 0.1399 0.0758 1.8456 0.0650 [-0.0087, 0.2884]  0.2113 0.0388 5.4498 0.0000 [0.1353, 0.2873] 
Δβ Country: Germany 0.0355 0.1172 0.3026 0.7622 [-0.1943, 0.2652]  -0.0046 0.0600 -0.0767 0.9388 [-0.1223, 0.1131] 
Δβ Country: UK 0.1971 0.1163 1.6939 0.0903 [-0.0309, 0.4251]  0.2531 0.0662 3.8251 0.0001 [0.1234, 0.3828] 
Δβ Country: France 0.0538 0.1164 0.4623 0.6439 [-0.1743, 0.2819]  0.1009 0.0486 2.0753 0.0380 [0.0056, 0.1961] 
Δβ Country: Japan -0.1581 0.2678 -0.5901 0.5551 [-0.683, 0.3669]  -0.0794 0.1286 -0.6171 0.5372 [-0.3315, 0.1728] 
Δβ Country: Hong Kong -0.2901 0.3575 -0.8114 0.4171 [-0.9909, 0.4107]  -0.1965 0.1600 -1.2281 0.2194 [-0.5102, 0.1171] 
Δβ Country: Other 0.1130 0.0815 1.3856 0.1659 [-0.0468, 0.2728]  0.1890 0.0367 5.1560 0.0000 [0.1172, 0.2609] 
β0 No Value Manipulation 0.4573 0.0262 17.4769 0.0000 [0.406, 0.5086]  0.3795 0.0131 28.8974 0.0000 [0.3538, 0.4052] 
Δβ Manipulating Value Downward -0.5146 0.0866 -5.9452 0.0000 [-0.6843, -0.345]  -0.4861 0.0624 -7.7959 0.0000 [-0.6083, -0.3639] 
Δβ Manipulating Value Upward 0.0495 0.0690 0.7167 0.4736 [-0.0858, 0.1848]  -0.0094 0.0400 -0.2355 0.8138 [-0.0878, 0.0689] 
β0 No Expectancy Manipulation 0.4718 0.0241 19.5488 0.0000 [0.4245, 0.5191]  0.4100 0.0117 34.9335 0.0000 [0.387, 0.4331] 
Δβ Manipulating Expectancy Downward -0.2186 0.0825 -2.6490 0.0081 [-0.3803, -0.0568]  -0.3485 0.0618 -5.6420 0.0000 [-0.4696, -0.2275] 
Δβ Manipulating Expectancy Upward -0.1520 0.0737 -2.0616 0.0392 [-0.2965, -0.0075]  -0.1855 0.0469 -3.9591 0.0001 [-0.2773, -0.0937] 
β0 Filler Task Absent 0.4647 0.0260 17.8402 0.0000 [0.4136, 0.5157]  0.3964 0.0125 31.7089 0.0000 [0.3719, 0.4209] 
Δβ Filler Task Present -0.0319 0.0547 -0.5825 0.5602 [-0.139, 0.0753]  -0.0488 0.0279 -1.7503 0.0801 [-0.1034, 0.0058] 
β0 Irrelevant Filler Task 0.5321 0.0719 7.4008 0.0000 [0.3912, 0.673]  0.3559 0.0285 12.4939 0.0000 [0.3001, 0.4118] 
Δβ Relevant Filler Task -0.2886 0.0915 -3.1538 0.0016 [-0.468, -0.1093]  -0.0566 0.0399 -1.4190 0.1559 [-0.1348, 0.0216] 
β0 Liminality: Subliminal 0.4612 0.0530 8.7031 0.0000 [0.3573, 0.565]  0.3793 0.0258 14.7136 0.0000 [0.3288, 0.4298] 
Δβ Liminality: Supraliminal -0.0025 0.0594 -0.0428 0.9658 [-0.1189, 0.1138]  0.0094 0.0286 0.3284 0.7426 [-0.0467, 0.0654] 
β0 Proportion of Primes Intercept 0.4421 0.0249 17.7445 0.0000 [0.3933, 0.4909]  0.3617 0.0117 30.8119 0.0000 [0.3387, 0.3847] 
Δβ Proportion of Primes 0.0672 0.0246 2.7338 0.0063 [0.019, 0.1154]  0.0593 0.0120 4.9344 0.0000 [0.0358, 0.0829] 
41 
 
Table 2 Continued            
            
 Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
 (Δ)β SE z p 95% CI  (Δ)β SE z p 95% CI 
β0 Control: Neutral Words 0.4625 0.0311 14.8503 0.0000 [0.4015, 0.5235]  0.3945 0.0142 27.8004 0.0000 [0.3667, 0.4224] 
Δβ Control: Nonsense Words -0.0082 0.1412 -0.0578 0.9539 [-0.2849, 0.2685]  0.0487 0.0696 0.7000 0.4839 [-0.0877, 0.1852] 
Δβ Control: No Task 0.0377 0.0750 0.5027 0.6152 [-0.1093, 0.1847]  0.0265 0.0366 0.7247 0.4687 [-0.0452, 0.0982] 
Δβ Control: Neutral Reading/Writing 0.0084 0.1305 0.0646 0.9485 [-0.2473, 0.2642]  0.0437 0.0663 0.6599 0.5093 [-0.0862, 0.1737] 
Δβ Control: Non-opposite Goal -0.0965 0.1036 -0.9320 0.3514 [-0.2995, 0.1065]  -0.0343 0.0529 -0.6476 0.5172 [-0.1381, 0.0695] 
Δβ Control: Other 0.0144 0.0841 0.1712 0.8641 [-0.1504, 0.1792]  -0.1068 0.0413 -2.5834 0.0098 [-0.1878, -0.0258] 
β0 Flexibility Intercept 0.4474 0.0516 8.6685 0.0000 [0.3463, 0.5486]  0.3991 0.0274 14.5777 0.0000 [0.3454, 0.4527] 
Δβ Flexibility 0.0076 0.0269 0.2814 0.7784 [-0.0452, 0.0604]  -0.0041 0.0147 -0.2823 0.7777 [-0.0329, 0.0246] 
β0 Funneled Debriefing Absent 0.4553 0.0326 13.9713 0.0000 [0.3914, 0.5192]  0.3729 0.0159 23.4467 0.0000 [0.3417, 0.4041] 
Δβ Funneled Debriefing Present 0.0037 0.0451 0.0821 0.9346 [-0.0848, 0.0922]  0.0145 0.0230 0.6311 0.5280 [-0.0305, 0.0595] 
β0 Method Category: Blank 0.5560 0.0629 8.8429 0.0000 [0.4328, 0.6792]  0.5380 0.0279 19.3046 0.0000 [0.4834, 0.5926] 
Δβ Method Category: Scrambled 
Sentence Task 
-0.2294 0.0799 -2.8708 0.0041 [-0.386, -0.0728]  -0.2497 0.0370 -6.7448 0.0000 [-0.3222, -0.1771] 
Δβ Method Category: Word Completion -0.1125 0.1377 -0.8169 0.4140 [-0.3825, 0.1574]  -0.1560 0.0646 -2.4164 0.0157 [-0.2826, -0.0295] 
Δβ Method Category: Other 0.0661 0.0752 0.8797 0.3790 [-0.0812, 0.2134]  -0.0231 0.0366 -0.6329 0.5268 [-0.0948, 0.0485] 
Δβ Method Category: Stroop Task 0.3408 0.2993 1.1386 0.2549 [-0.2458, 0.9274]  0.4396 0.2057 2.1367 0.0326 [0.0364, 0.8428] 
Δβ Method Category: Free Association -0.0982 0.3428 -0.2863 0.7746 [-0.7701, 0.5738]  -0.0802 0.1678 -0.4779 0.6327 [-0.4091, 0.2487] 
Δβ Method Category: Social Goal 
Contagion Task 
0.0072 0.2345 0.0306 0.9756 [-0.4524, 0.4667]  0.0067 0.1495 0.0450 0.9641 [-0.2863, 0.2997] 
Δβ Method Category: Parafoveal 
Priming Task 
-0.1697 0.1316 -1.2888 0.1975 [-0.4277, 0.0884]  -0.3069 0.0551 -5.5721 0.0000 [-0.4148, -0.1989] 
Δβ Method Category: Lexical Decision 
Task 
-0.1002 0.1585 -0.6321 0.5273 [-0.411, 0.2105]  -0.0982 0.0926 -1.0607 0.2888 [-0.2797, 0.0833] 
Δβ Method Category: Self-story (write 
about own experience(s)) 
-0.3379 0.1509 -2.2397 0.0251 [-0.6336, -0.0422]  -0.2750 0.0716 -3.8400 0.0001 [-0.4154, -0.1346] 
Δβ Method Category: Autobiographical 
Writing (write about someone else) 
-0.1904 0.1952 -0.9756 0.3293 [-0.5729, 0.1921]  -0.1531 0.1077 -1.4212 0.1553 [-0.3643, 0.0581] 
Δβ Method Category: Autobiographical 
Reading (read about someone else) 
-0.2860 0.2654 -1.0777 0.2812 [-0.8062, 0.2342]  -0.3407 0.1460 -2.3335 0.0196 [-0.6269, -0.0545] 
Δβ Method Category: Foveal Priming 
Task 
-0.1240 0.0946 -1.3106 0.1900 [-0.3094, 0.0614]  -0.1279 0.0479 -2.6690 0.0076 [-0.2219, -0.034] 
42 
 
Table 2 Continued            
            
 Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
 (Δ)β SE z p 95% CI  (Δ)β SE z p 95% CI 
Δβ Method Category: Word Search -0.2390 0.0860 -2.7791 0.0055 [-0.4075, -0.0704]  -0.2778 0.0411 -6.7630 0.0000 [-0.3583, -0.1973] 
β0 Low Value 0.3404 0.0453 7.5084 0.0000 [0.2516, 0.4293]  0.3275 0.0216 15.1435 0.0000 [0.2851, 0.3699] 
Δβ High Value 0.0641 0.0183 3.5023 0.0005 [0.0282, 0.1]  0.0268 0.0094 2.8419 0.0045 [0.0083, 0.0452] 
β0 Prime: Words Not Related to People  0.3630 0.0324 11.2185 0.0000 [0.2996, 0.4264]  0.3158 0.0155 20.3106 0.0000 [0.2853, 0.3462] 
Δβ Prime: Words Related to People 0.1799 0.1170 1.5373 0.1242 [-0.0495, 0.4092]  0.0508 0.0513 0.9903 0.3220 [-0.0498, 0.1514] 
Δβ Prime: Non-Human Pictures 0.3256 0.1295 2.5151 0.0119 [0.0719, 0.5794]  0.1521 0.0671 2.2660 0.0234 [0.0205, 0.2836] 
Δβ Prime: Human Pictures 0.2875 0.0930 3.0923 0.0020 [0.1053, 0.4698]  0.2755 0.0494 5.5744 0.0000 [0.1786, 0.3724] 
Δβ Prime: Other 0.1594 0.0617 2.5860 0.0097 [0.0386, 0.2803]  0.0873 0.0303 2.8786 0.0040 [0.0279, 0.1468] 
β0 Goal: Achievement 0.3548 0.0436 8.1353 0.0000 [0.2693, 0.4403]  0.3177 0.0214 14.8576 0.0000 [0.2758, 0.3596] 
Δβ Goal: Helping/Cooperation 0.3541 0.1072 3.3029 0.0010 [0.144, 0.5643]  0.3669 0.0540 6.7929 0.0000 [0.2611, 0.4728] 
Δβ Goal: Action 0.0362 0.1095 0.3309 0.7407 [-0.1784, 0.2509]  0.0289 0.0609 0.4736 0.6358 [-0.0906, 0.1483] 
Δβ Goal: Inaction 0.0012 0.1244 0.0097 0.9922 [-0.2426, 0.245]  0.0102 0.0796 0.1279 0.8982 [-0.1458, 0.1661] 
Δβ Goal: Aggression -0.0491 0.3842 -0.1277 0.8984 [-0.8022, 0.704]  -0.0120 0.2436 -0.0492 0.9608 [-0.4894, 0.4655] 
Δβ Goal: Socialization 0.0833 0.1357 0.6138 0.5394 [-0.1827, 0.3492]  0.1291 0.0878 1.4700 0.1416 [-0.043, 0.3013] 
Δβ Goal: Autonomy 0.0905 0.1562 0.5792 0.5624 [-0.2157, 0.3967]  -0.0157 0.1037 -0.1511 0.8799 [-0.219, 0.1877] 
Δβ Goal: Studying 0.0009 0.2528 0.0034 0.9973 [-0.4947, 0.4964]  0.0193 0.1338 0.1439 0.8856 [-0.2429, 0.2814] 
Δβ Goal: Failure 0.7813 0.4049 1.9295 0.0537 [-0.0123, 1.575]  0.8184 0.2751 2.9751 0.0029 [0.2793, 1.3576] 
Δβ Goal: Efficacy 0.4252 0.4431 0.9595 0.3373 [-0.4433, 1.2937]  0.4623 0.3287 1.4062 0.1597 [-0.182, 1.1066] 
Δβ Goal: Consumption 0.3196 0.1553 2.0586 0.0395 [0.0153, 0.6239]  0.3262 0.0821 3.9723 0.0001 [0.1652, 0.4871] 
Δβ Goal: Impression Formation 0.3215 0.1543 2.0833 0.0372 [0.019, 0.6239]  0.2430 0.0825 2.9444 0.0032 [0.0812, 0.4047] 
Δβ Goal: Health/Dieting -0.0138 0.1066 -0.1292 0.8972 [-0.2226, 0.1951]  0.0436 0.0582 0.7497 0.4535 [-0.0704, 0.1576] 
Δβ Goal: Fairness 0.0833 0.2055 0.4053 0.6852 [-0.3194, 0.486]  0.0575 0.1013 0.5681 0.5700 [-0.1409, 0.256] 
Δβ Goal: Seeking Casual Sex 0.1582 0.1651 0.9585 0.3378 [-0.1653, 0.4818]  0.0115 0.1245 0.0925 0.9263 [-0.2325, 0.2556] 
Δβ Goal: Other 0.1429 0.0543 2.6328 0.0085 [0.0365, 0.2493]  0.0690 0.0278 2.4817 0.0131 [0.0145, 0.1234] 
Δβ Goal: Elderly 0.7410 0.2618 2.8301 0.0047 [0.2278, 1.2542]  0.6249 0.2277 2.7440 0.0061 [0.1786, 1.0713] 
Δβ Goal: Courage -1.1214 0.4680 -2.3964 0.0166 [-2.0386, -0.2043]  -1.0843 0.3615 -2.9995 0.0027 [-1.7929, -0.3758] 
Δβ Goal: Defensiveness/Intimacy -0.5874 0.3499 -1.6787 0.0932 [-1.2731, 0.0984]  -0.5503 0.1847 -2.9787 0.0029 [-0.9123, -0.1882] 
Δβ Goal: Entertain 0.4745 0.2701 1.7569 0.0789 [-0.0548, 1.0038]  0.2157 0.2096 1.0290 0.3035 [-0.1951, 0.6264] 
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Table 2 Continued            
            
 Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
 (Δ)β SE z p 95% CI  (Δ)β SE z p 95% CI 
Δβ Goal: Self-Regulation -0.1191 0.1379 -0.8636 0.3878 [-0.3895, 0.1512]  -0.1173 0.0768 -1.5282 0.1265 [-0.2678, 0.0331] 
Δβ Goal: Speed 0.1795 0.3793 0.4732 0.6361 [-0.5639, 0.9228]  0.2166 0.2357 0.9188 0.3582 [-0.2454, 0.6785] 
Δβ Goal: Slowness 0.0661 0.4410 0.1499 0.8809 [-0.7983, 0.9305]  0.1032 0.3259 0.3167 0.7515 [-0.5355, 0.7419] 
Δβ Goal: Indulgence 0.1828 0.3395 0.5384 0.5903 [-0.4826, 0.8481]  -0.0870 0.2855 -0.3048 0.7605 [-0.6467, 0.4726] 
Δβ Goal: Extrinsic/Intrinsic Motivation -0.0440 0.3176 -0.1384 0.8899 [-0.6666, 0.5786]  -0.0069 0.1122 -0.0613 0.9511 [-0.2269, 0.2131] 
Δβ Goal: Market/Trade -0.2288 0.2581 -0.8865 0.3753 [-0.7347, 0.2771]  -0.1480 0.1170 -1.2644 0.2061 [-0.3774, 0.0814] 
Δβ Goal: Unkindness 0.3603 0.2734 1.3179 0.1875 [-0.1755, 0.8962]  0.3976 0.1721 2.3106 0.0209 [0.0603, 0.7348] 
β0 DV: Achievement 0.4020 0.0368 10.9139 0.0000 [0.3298, 0.4742]  0.3714 0.0185 20.1211 0.0000 [0.3352, 0.4076] 
Δβ DV: Reaction Time 0.0657 0.0919 0.7148 0.4747 [-0.1144, 0.2457]  -0.1065 0.0398 -2.6723 0.0075 [-0.1845, -0.0284] 
Δβ DV: Time Spent on Task -0.0265 0.0648 -0.4082 0.6831 [-0.1534, 0.1005]  -0.0207 0.0379 -0.5465 0.5847 [-0.095, 0.0535] 
Δβ DV: Enacted Monetary Donation -0.0489 0.1107 -0.4417 0.6587 [-0.266, 0.1681]  0.0924 0.0732 1.2620 0.2069 [-0.0511, 0.2358] 
Δβ DV: Enacted Monetary Spending -0.2230 0.1876 -1.1889 0.2345 [-0.5908, 0.1447]  -0.1785 0.0900 -1.9833 0.0473 [-0.3548, -0.0021] 
Δβ DV: Enacted Volunteering Time 0.2428 0.1365 1.7787 0.0753 [-0.0247, 0.5104]  0.2900 0.0764 3.7966 0.0001 [0.1403, 0.4397] 
Δβ DV: Consumption 0.2398 0.0889 2.6980 0.0070 [0.0656, 0.4139]  0.1321 0.0467 2.8258 0.0047 [0.0405, 0.2237] 
Δβ DV: Enacted Choice of Product 0.1088 0.1515 0.7181 0.4727 [-0.1882, 0.4059]  -0.0445 0.0688 -0.6467 0.5178 [-0.1794, 0.0904] 
Δβ DV: Other 0.2042 0.0612 3.3359 0.0009 [0.0842, 0.3242]  0.0811 0.0323 2.5144 0.0119 [0.0179, 0.1444] 
Δβ DV: Helping Rates 0.4821 0.3224 1.4954 0.1348 [-0.1498, 1.1139]  0.3479 0.2226 1.5626 0.1182 [-0.0885, 0.7843] 
Δβ DV: Spacebar Presses -0.1808 0.3368 -0.5369 0.5913 [-0.841, 0.4793]  -0.1503 0.1316 -1.1421 0.2534 [-0.4082, 0.1076] 
Δβ DV: Number of Thoughts Listed -0.2064 0.3602 -0.5731 0.5666 [-0.9123, 0.4995]  -0.1758 0.1833 -0.9594 0.3374 [-0.5351, 0.1834] 
Δβ DV: Approach Task -1.1686 0.4761 -2.4543 0.0141 [-2.1018, -0.2354]  -1.1380 0.3613 -3.1494 0.0016 [-1.8462, -0.4298] 
Δβ DV: Free Association/Selective 
Information Exposure 
0.0825 0.2424 0.3405 0.7335 [-0.3926, 0.5577]  0.1206 0.0955 1.2626 0.2067 [-0.0666, 0.3077] 
Δβ DV: Task Choice -0.0229 0.2995 -0.0764 0.9391 [-0.6099, 0.5642]  0.0559 0.2005 0.2789 0.7803 [-0.3371, 0.449] 
Δβ DV: Face Touching 0.1065 0.3323 0.3203 0.7487 [-0.5449, 0.7578]  0.1207 0.2478 0.4868 0.6264 [-0.3651, 0.6064] 
Δβ DV: Choice of Stairs or Elevator 0.3216 0.3764 0.8545 0.3928 [-0.4161, 1.0592]  0.3522 0.2133 1.6507 0.0988 [-0.066, 0.7703] 
Δβ DV: 20 -0.3637 0.3848 -0.9450 0.3447 [-1.1179, 0.3906]  -0.3331 0.2280 -1.4612 0.1440 [-0.7799, 0.1137] 
Δβ DV: Amount of Information Selected -0.3113 0.3547 -0.8776 0.3802 [-1.0066, 0.384]  -0.2807 0.1724 -1.6288 0.1034 [-0.6186, 0.0571] 
Δβ DV: Adjustment to Change 0.2042 0.3376 0.6048 0.5453 [-0.4575, 0.8658]  0.2347 0.1335 1.7585 0.0787 [-0.0269, 0.4964] 
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Table 2 Continued            
            
 Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
 (Δ)β SE z p 95% CI  (Δ)β SE z p 95% CI 
Δβ DV: Curiosity 0.1085 0.3849 0.2818 0.7781 [-0.646, 0.8629]  0.1390 0.2281 0.6095 0.5422 [-0.3081, 0.5861] 
Δβ DV: Cleanliness 0.0499 0.3867 0.1289 0.8974 [-0.7082, 0.8079]  0.0804 0.2312 0.3479 0.7279 [-0.3727, 0.5335] 
Δβ DV: Arm-Holding Task -0.5300 0.2838 -1.8679 0.0618 [-1.0862, 0.0261]  -0.4784 0.1757 -2.7228 0.0065 [-0.8227, -0.134] 
Δβ DV: Time Spent on Puzzles -0.5174 0.2141 -2.4170 0.0156 [-0.937, -0.0978]  -0.3720 0.1697 -2.1916 0.0284 [-0.7047, -0.0393] 
Δβ DV: Choice of Game 0.1142 0.3884 0.2941 0.7687 [-0.647, 0.8755]  0.1448 0.2339 0.6189 0.5360 [-0.3137, 0.6033] 
Δβ DV: 35 0.7326 0.3924 1.8668 0.0619 [-0.0365, 1.5016]  0.6809 0.3437 1.9813 0.0476 [0.0073, 1.3545] 
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Table 3 
 
Regression Results Single Moderators with All Covariates Included 
 
 3a: Random Effects  3b: Fixed Effects 
 (Δ)β SE z p k 95% CI  (Δ)β SE z p k 95% CI 
β0 Direct Primes 0.3166 0.1032 3.0682 0.0022 503 [0.1143, 0.5188]  0.3594 0.051 7.0517 0 503 [0.2595, 0.4593] 
Δβ Indirect Primes 0.201 0.0741 2.7136 0.0067 503 [0.0558, 0.3462]  0.1592 0.0392 4.0573 0 503 [0.0823, 0.2361] 
β0 Manipulating Value 0.3561 0.1072 3.3227 0.0009 445 [0.146, 0.5661]  0.3552 0.0543 6.5381 0 445 [0.2488, 0.4617] 
Δβ Decreasing Value -0.4634 0.091 -5.095 0 445 [-0.6417, -0.2852]  -0.4399 0.0656 -6.7079 0 445 [-0.5684, -0.3114] 
Δβ Increasing Value 0.1377 0.0829 1.662 0.0965 445 [-0.0247, 0.3001]  -0.0047 0.0545 -0.0854 0.9320 445 [-0.1114, 0.1021] 
β0 Low Value 0.1952 0.1269 1.5378 0.1241 397 [-0.0536, 0.444]  0.2587 0.0622 4.1591 0 397 [0.1368, 0.3806] 
Δβ High Value 0.1426 0.07 2.0362 0.0417 397 [0.0053, 0.2798]  0.0047 0.0396 0.1193 0.9050 397 [-0.073, 0.0824] 
β0 Manipulating 
Expectancy 
0.3609 0.106 3.4045 0.0007 445 [0.1531, 0.5686]  0.3477 0.0543 6.4037 0 445 [0.2413, 0.4541] 
Δβ Decreasing 
Expectancy 
-0.2496 0.1034 -2.4144 0.0158 445 [-0.4522, -0.047]  -0.2465 0.0778 -3.1667 0.0015 445 [-0.399, -0.0939] 
Δβ Increasing Expectancy -0.3035 0.1071 -2.8325 0.0046 445 [-0.5135, -0.0935]  -0.2419 0.0601 -4.0234 0.0001 445 [-0.3597, -0.124] 
β0 Value X Manipulating 
Expectancy (Low Value, 
No Manipulation of 
Expectancy) 
0.2299 0.1242 1.8506 0.0642 397 [-0.0136, 0.4733]  0.2963 0.0627 4.7251 0 397 [0.1734, 0.4193] 
Δβ High Value 0.1158 0.0701 1.6518 0.0986 397 [-0.0216, 0.2531]  -0.0435 0.0418 -1.0402 0.2983 397 [-0.1254, 0.0384] 
Δβ Decreasing 
Expectancy 
-0.1392 0.1285 -1.0829 0.2789 397 [-0.3911, 0.1127]  -0.2354 0.0964 -2.4418 0.0146 397 [-0.4244, -0.0465] 
Δβ Increasing Expectancy -0.3406 0.134 -2.5425 0.0110 397 [-0.6032, -0.078]  -0.3706 0.0797 -4.652 0 397 [-0.5267, -0.2144] 
Δβ High Value and 
Decreased Expectancy 
-0.2362 0.2685 -0.8798 0.3790 397 [-0.7624, 0.29]  -0.0292 0.1831 -0.1596 0.8732 397 [-0.3882, 0.3297] 
Δβ High Value and 
Increased Expectancy 
0.0817 0.3367 0.2425 0.8084 397 [-0.5783, 0.7416]  0.2726 0.2182 1.2495 0.2115 397 [-0.155, 0.7002] 
β0 No Filler Task 0.3842 0.1161 3.3083 0.0009 439 [0.1566, 0.6118]  0.3489 0.0577 6.0441 0 439 [0.2358, 0.4621] 
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Table 3 Continued              
              
 3a: Random Effects  3b: Fixed Effects 
 (Δ)β SE z p k 95% CI  (Δ)β SE z p k 95% CI 
Δβ Irrelevant Filler Task 0.0838 0.0884 0.9483 0.3430 439 [-0.0894, 0.257]  -0.0327 0.0419 -0.7807 0.4350 439 [-0.1149, 0.0494] 
Δβ Relevant Filler Task -0.3515 0.1665 -2.1112 0.0348 439 [-0.6778, -0.0252]  -0.0922 0.0828 -1.1136 0.2654 439 [-0.2546, 0.0701] 
β0 Value X Filler Task 
(Low Value, No Filler 
Task) 
0.2781 0.1362 2.0415 0.0412 393 [0.0111, 0.5451]  0.3277 0.0669 4.898 0 393 [0.1966, 0.4588] 
Δβ High Value 0.0955 0.0806 1.1861 0.2356 393 [-0.0623, 0.2534]  -0.0517 0.0436 -1.1858 0.2357 393 [-0.1373, 0.0338] 
Δβ Irrelevant Filler Task 0.0289 0.1107 0.2611 0.7940 393 [-0.1881, 0.2459]  -0.1226 0.052 -2.3561 0.0185 393 [-0.2245, -0.0206] 
Δβ Relevant Filler Task -0.5694 0.2364 -2.4088 0.0160 393 [-1.0327, -0.1061]  -0.2771 0.1219 -2.2736 0.0230 393 [-0.5159, -0.0382] 
Δβ High Value and 
Irrelevant Filler Task 
0.0973 0.1677 0.5803 0.5617 393 [-0.2314, 0.426]  0.2423 0.098 2.4719 0.0134 393 [0.0502, 0.4344] 
Δβ High Value and 
Relevant Filler Task 
0.2395 0.3232 0.741 0.4587 393 [-0.3939, 0.8729]  0.1709 0.173 0.9884 0.3230 393 [-0.168, 0.5099] 
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Table 4 
 
Results of a Regression Containing All Descriptive and Methodological Variables 
 
 4a: Random Effects  4b: Fixed Effects 
 (Δ)β SE z p 95% CI  (Δ)β SE z p 95% CI 
Intercept 0.3018 0.1905 1.5844 0.1131 [-0.0715, 0.6752]  0.3018 0.1905 1.5844 0.1131 [-0.0715, 0.6752] 
Year (scaled) -0.0165 0.035 -0.4724 0.6366 [-0.0852, 0.0521]  -0.0165 0.035 -0.4724 0.6366 [-0.0852, 0.0521] 
Publication status: Unpublished -0.1825 0.0762 -2.3944 0.0166 [-0.3319, -0.0331]  -0.1825 0.0762 -2.3944 0.0166 [-0.3319, -0.0331] 
Country: Non-US 0.0367 0.0657 0.5584 0.5766 [-0.0921, 0.1654]  0.0367 0.0657 0.5584 0.5766 [-0.0921, 0.1654] 
Liminality: Supraliminal -0.0331 0.1588 -0.2082 0.8350 [-0.3444, 0.2782]  -0.0331 0.1588 -0.2082 0.8350 [-0.3444, 0.2782] 
Proportion of Primes (scaled) -0.0103 0.0371 -0.2785 0.7807 [-0.0831, 0.0624]  -0.0103 0.0371 -0.2785 0.7807 [-0.0831, 0.0624] 
Control Type: Not Neutral Words -0.2386 0.0827 -2.8841 0.0039 [-0.4008, -0.0765]  -0.2386 0.0827 -2.8841 0.0039 [-0.4008, -0.0765] 
Goal/Concept: Social 0.1294 0.1267 1.0212 0.3072 [-0.119, 0.3778]  0.1294 0.1267 1.0212 0.3072 [-0.119, 0.3778] 
Goal/Concept: Consumption 0.2001 0.1586 1.2614 0.2072 [-0.1108, 0.5109]  0.2001 0.1586 1.2614 0.2072 [-0.1108, 0.5109] 
Goal/Concept: Self Concept 0.2977 0.1285 2.3169 0.0205 [0.0459, 0.5495]  0.2977 0.1285 2.3169 0.0205 [0.0459, 0.5495] 
Goal/Concept: Other 0.1075 0.0778 1.3827 0.1668 [-0.0449, 0.26]  0.1075 0.0778 1.3827 0.1668 [-0.0449, 0.26] 
DV: Reaction Time -0.1 0.134 -0.7461 0.4556 [-0.3626, 0.1627]  -0.1 0.134 -0.7461 0.4556 [-0.3626, 0.1627] 
DV: Usage of Time -0.0604 0.0876 -0.6895 0.4905 [-0.2321, 0.1113]  -0.0604 0.0876 -0.6895 0.4905 [-0.2321, 0.1113] 
DV: Usage of Money -0.195 0.1588 -1.2279 0.2195 [-0.5061, 0.1162]  -0.195 0.1588 -1.2279 0.2195 [-0.5061, 0.1162] 
DV: Consumption 0.1085 0.1525 0.7112 0.4770 [-0.1905, 0.4074]  0.1085 0.1525 0.7112 0.4770 [-0.1905, 0.4074] 
DV: Product Choice -0.1613 0.2198 -0.7339 0.4630 [-0.592, 0.2694]  -0.1613 0.2198 -0.7339 0.4630 [-0.592, 0.2694] 
DV: Other -0.1095 0.0764 -1.4335 0.1517 [-0.2593, 0.0402]  -0.1095 0.0764 -1.4335 0.1517 [-0.2593, 0.0402] 
Presence of Funneled Debriefing 0.0416 0.0657 0.6325 0.5270 [-0.0872, 0.1703]  0.0416 0.0657 0.6325 0.5270 [-0.0872, 0.1703] 
High Task Flexibility 0.0819 0.0654 1.2527 0.2103 [-0.0463, 0.2102]  0.0819 0.0654 1.2527 0.2103 [-0.0463, 0.2102] 
Priming Method: Word Tasks -0.0052 0.0898 -0.058 0.9537 [-0.1812, 0.1708]  -0.0052 0.0898 -0.058 0.9537 [-0.1812, 0.1708] 
Priming Method: Pictures 0.0627 0.1715 0.3657 0.7146 [-0.2734, 0.3989]  0.0627 0.1715 0.3657 0.7146 [-0.2734, 0.3989] 
Priming Method: Reading/Writing Tasks -0.0789 0.217 -0.3634 0.7163 [-0.5043, 0.3465]  -0.0789 0.217 -0.3634 0.7163 [-0.5043, 0.3465] 
Priming Method: Other 0.2579 0.1181 2.1828 0.0291 [0.0263, 0.4895]  0.2579 0.1181 2.1828 0.0291 [0.0263, 0.4895] 
Priming Method: Writing About Self -0.0497 0.2396 -0.2073 0.8358 [-0.5192, 0.4199]  -0.0497 0.2396 -0.2073 0.8358 [-0.5192, 0.4199] 
Primes: Words Related to People 0.3034 0.1482 2.047 0.0407 [0.0129, 0.5939]  0.3034 0.1482 2.047 0.0407 [0.0129, 0.5939] 
Primes: Pictures 0.2434 0.1271 1.9151 0.0555 [-0.0057, 0.4925]  0.2434 0.1271 1.9151 0.0555 [-0.0057, 0.4925] 
Primes: Other 0.1115 0.1362 0.8183 0.4132 [-0.1555, 0.3784]  0.1115 0.1362 0.8183 0.4132 [-0.1555, 0.3784] 
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Table 5 
 
Results of a Regression Containing All Moderators, No Covariates 
 
 5a: Random Effects  5b: Fixed Effects 
 (Δ)β SE z p 95% CI  (Δ)β SE z p 95% CI 
β0 Intercept 0.4007 0.0494 8.1113 0 [0.3039, 0.4975]  0.3849 0.0238 16.1672 0 [0.3383, 0.4316] 
Δβ Indirect Primes 0.126 0.0562 2.2432 0.0249 [0.0159, 0.236]  0.0981 0.0276 3.5552 0.0004 [0.044, 0.1522] 
Δβ Manipulating Value Downward -0.5159 0.0948 -5.4403 0 [-0.7017, -0.33]  -0.4335 0.0707 -6.1355 0 [-0.572, -0.295] 
Δβ Manipulating Value Upward -0.0188 0.0808 -0.2327 0.8160 [-0.1772, 0.1396]  0.0655 0.0523 1.2523 0.2105 [-0.037, 0.1681] 
Δβ High Value 0.0743 0.0609 1.2198 0.2225 [-0.0451, 0.1936]  0.006 0.0324 0.1847 0.8535 [-0.0576, 0.0695] 
Δβ Manipulating Expectancy Downward 0.0588 0.1133 0.5189 0.6039 [-0.1632, 0.2807]  -0.0493 0.0891 -0.553 0.5802 [-0.2238, 0.1253] 
Δβ Manipulating Expectancy Upward -0.265 0.1312 -2.0193 0.0435 [-0.5222, -0.0078]  -0.327 0.0707 -4.6253 0 [-0.4656, -0.1884] 
Δβ Irrelevant Filler Task 0.0673 0.0959 0.7012 0.4832 [-0.1207, 0.2553]  -0.0929 0.0425 -2.1878 0.0287 [-0.1761, -0.0097] 
Δβ Relevant Filler Task -0.3895 0.1789 -2.1767 0.0295 [-0.7401, -0.0388]  -0.167 0.0754 -2.2146 0.0268 [-0.3148, -0.0192] 
Δβ High Value X Decreasing Expectancy -0.3537 0.2392 -1.4782 0.1394 [-0.8226, 0.1153]  -0.3149 0.1746 -1.8035 0.0713 [-0.6571, 0.0273] 
Δβ High Value X Increasing Expectancy 0.2353 0.2392 0.984 0.3251 [-0.2334, 0.7041]  0.2893 0.1376 2.1022 0.0355 [0.0196, 0.5591] 
Δβ High Value X Irrelevant Filler -0.0228 0.148 -0.1543 0.8774 [-0.3129, 0.2672]  0.1249 0.0823 1.5174 0.1292 [-0.0364, 0.2861] 
Δβ High Value X Relevant Filler 0.0981 0.2784 0.3525 0.7244 [-0.4475, 0.6437]  0.0692 0.138 0.5014 0.6161 [-0.2013, 0.3397] 
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Table 6 
 
Results of a Regression Containing All Variables 
 
 Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
 (Δ)β SE z p 95% CI  (Δ)β SE z p 95% CI 
Intercept 0.2905 0.1297 2.2397 0.0251 [0.0363, 0.5448]  0.3884 0.0661 5.8724 0 [0.2587, 0.518] 
Indirect Primes 0.202 0.0901 2.2419 0.0250 [0.0254, 0.3787]  0.2174 0.0515 4.2189 0 [0.1164, 0.3183] 
Manipulating Value Downward -0.4469 0.1035 -4.3175 0 [-0.6497, -0.244]  -0.3825 0.0781 -4.8956 0 [-0.5357, -0.2294] 
Manipulating Value Upward 0.1246 0.1009 1.2347 0.2170 [-0.0732, 0.3224]  0.2451 0.075 3.266 0.0011 [0.098, 0.3922] 
High Value -0.0138 0.0795 -0.1738 0.8620 [-0.1697, 0.1421]  -0.1776 0.044 -4.0316 0.0001 [-0.2639, -0.0912] 
Manipulating Expectancy Downward -0.0499 0.1337 -0.373 0.7091 [-0.3118, 0.2121]  -0.1294 0.1055 -1.2269 0.2198 [-0.3361, 0.0773] 
Manipulating Expectancy Upward -0.3601 0.137 -2.6274 0.0086 [-0.6287, -0.0915]  -0.5236 0.0842 -6.2178 0 [-0.6886, -0.3585] 
Irrelevant Filler Task 0.0359 0.1091 0.3289 0.7422 [-0.178, 0.2498]  -0.1265 0.0559 -2.2615 0.0237 [-0.2361, -0.0169] 
Relevant Filler Task -0.6077 0.2313 -2.6266 0.0086 [-1.0611, -0.1542]  -0.3033 0.1219 -2.4885 0.0128 [-0.5423, -0.0644] 
Year (scaled) -0.0385 0.04 -0.9619 0.3361 [-0.1169, 0.0399]  -0.0558 0.0213 -2.6243 0.0087 [-0.0974, -0.0141] 
Publication status: Unpublished -0.1914 0.0823 -2.3251 0.0201 [-0.3527, -0.0301]  -0.1866 0.0414 -4.5112 0 [-0.2677, -0.1055] 
Country: Non-US 0.0888 0.0735 1.2087 0.2268 [-0.0552, 0.2329]  0.1182 0.0387 3.0581 0.0022 [0.0424, 0.194] 
Liminality: Supraliminal -0.0261 0.101 -0.2588 0.7958 [-0.2242, 0.1719]  -0.0448 0.0539 -0.8312 0.4059 [-0.1505, 0.0609] 
Proportion of Primes (scaled) 0.0531 0.0396 1.3429 0.1793 [-0.0244, 0.1307]  0.056 0.0204 2.7488 0.0060 [0.0161, 0.0959] 
Control Type: Not Neutral Words -0.1489 0.0883 -1.6875 0.0915 [-0.3219, 0.0241]  -0.0872 0.049 -1.7786 0.0753 [-0.1833, 0.0089] 
Goal/Concept: Social 0.1388 0.1399 0.9917 0.3214 [-0.1355, 0.4131]  0.0147 0.0865 0.1701 0.8650 [-0.1548, 0.1842] 
Goal/Concept: Consumption 0.0004 0.1888 0.0023 0.9982 [-0.3696, 0.3705]  0.1404 0.1075 1.3054 0.1917 [-0.0704, 0.3511] 
Goal/Concept: Self Concept 0.279 0.1358 2.0536 0.0400 [0.0127, 0.5452]  0.1757 0.0831 2.113 0.0346 [0.0127, 0.3387] 
Goal/Concept: Other 0.048 0.0941 0.5099 0.6102 [-0.1365, 0.2325]  -0.1073 0.0519 -2.0652 0.0389 [-0.2091, -0.0055] 
DV: Reaction Time 0.1236 0.1675 0.7378 0.4606 [-0.2047, 0.4519]  0.0392 0.0813 0.4824 0.6296 [-0.1201, 0.1985] 
DV: Usage of Time -0.0983 0.0906 -1.085 0.2779 [-0.2759, 0.0793]  -0.1205 0.0463 -2.5994 0.0093 [-0.2113, -0.0296] 
DV: Usage of Money -0.2012 0.1875 -1.0729 0.2833 [-0.5686, 0.1663]  -0.0502 0.1105 -0.4539 0.6499 [-0.2668, 0.1665] 
DV: Consumption 0.4286 0.1802 2.3787 0.0174 [0.0754, 0.7817]  0.295 0.0996 2.961 0.0031 [0.0997, 0.4902] 
DV: Product Choice 0.7401 0.3677 2.0126 0.0442 [0.0193, 1.4609]  0.4456 0.2076 2.1464 0.0318 [0.0387, 0.8525] 
DV: Other -0.0516 0.0869 -0.5934 0.5529 [-0.2219, 0.1187]  0.0348 0.0483 0.72 0.4715 [-0.0599, 0.1294] 
Presence of Funneled Debriefing 0.0677 0.0715 0.9475 0.3434 [-0.0724, 0.2078]  0.0543 0.037 1.4666 0.1425 [-0.0183, 0.1269] 
High Task Flexibility 0.1699 0.076 2.234 0.0255 [0.0208, 0.3189]  0.1715 0.0408 4.1995 0 [0.0915, 0.2516] 
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Table 6 Continued            
            
 Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
 (Δ)β SE z p 95% CI  (Δ)β SE z p 95% CI 
High Value X Decreasing Expectancy -0.3179 0.2714 -1.1712 0.2415 [-0.8499, 0.2141]  -0.117 0.1865 -0.6273 0.5304 [-0.4826, 0.2486] 
High Value X Increasing Expectancy 0.0995 0.3392 0.2933 0.7693 [-0.5653, 0.7642]  0.3831 0.2204 1.7381 0.0822 [-0.0489, 0.815] 
High Value X Irrelevant Filler 0.076 0.1631 0.4661 0.6412 [-0.2437, 0.3958]  0.2116 0.0977 2.1656 0.0303 [0.0201, 0.403] 
High Value X Relevant Filler 0.3414 0.3161 1.08 0.2802 [-0.2782, 0.961]  0.2153 0.1724 1.2492 0.2116 [-0.1225, 0.5532] 
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Figure 1 
 
Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
 
Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
 
Vevea and Hedges (1995) Density Plot of All Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
 
Figure 8 
 
55 
 
Figure 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 
 
Vevea and Hedges (1995) Density Plot of Directly Linked Primes Data 
 
56 
 
Figure 11 
 
Figure 12 
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Figure 13 
 
Figure 14 
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Figure 15 
 
Vevea and Hedges (1995) Density Plot of Indirectly Linked Primes Data 
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